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1 results

  • 4 - Arguments for Substance Dualism

  • Andrew Brenner, Hong Kong Baptist University
  • Book:
    Personal Ontology
    Published online:
    07 March 2024
    Print publication:
    14 March 2024, pp 70-101

  • Summary

    This chapter argues that the main arguments for substance dualism can be parodied and transformed either into arguments against substance dualism, or into arguments for the thesis that we are composite physical objects. The upshot of the chapter is that those considerations commonly thought to support substance dualism are indecisive at best, since they can be parodied. The arguments discussed include: modal arguments; an epistemic argument; the argument from the alleged fact that facts regarding personal identity outstrip the physical facts; the argument from phenomenology and intentionality; the argument from the unity of consciousness; Lowe’s argument from unity; and the argument from the problem of the many.