Chapter 11 examines the steps needed to rescue Brandt’s Ostpolitik from its near-demise at the hands of a polarized Bundestag. Following a rash of back-channel diplomacy with Egon Bahr at the center, France, Britain, the United States, and the USSR finally reached a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin; it guaranteed access to the city but failed to clarify West Berlin’s relationship to the Federal Republic, leaving room for future disputes. Brandt’s surprise visit to Brezhnev in Crimea deepened the relationship between these two leaders, but created suspicion in the Western camp that did not ease even with Brandt’s award of the Nobel Peace Prize. Rainer Barzel, leader of the CDU/CSU, insisted that the Warsaw and Moscow treaties must be renegotiated; he maneuvered in the Bundestag to overthrow the Brandt government. Outside observers feared that the entire course of détente was in jeopardy. Barzel’s bid for power failed, but he continued to seek concessions from the Soviets; the GDR did briefly take a softer line. The treaties passed without CDU/CSU support, and Brandt went on to win a decisive victory in the 1972 elections, affirming public backing for Ostpolitik.

In Chapter 8, focus turns to the handiwork of Brandt’s Ostpolitik – the negotiation of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in 1970. Egon Bahr’s bargaining strategy in Moscow was hasty and dilettantish; he did not worry overly about the contents of the treaty with the USSR, since he saw the agreement as only one component of an interlocking series of treaties. When the substance of the “Bahr Paper” was leaked, his secretive approach and his failure to address the Berlin problem further polarized German politics. The CDU/CSU vehemently rejected Brandt’s policies and members of the coalition parties began to defect. The external resonance of German Ostpolitik was nonetheless enormous. Brandt’s meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow alerted the world to the ebbing of Soviet hostility, resulting in greater maneuvering room for Bonn. When the chancellor kneeled in Warsaw, it appeared to signal German acceptance of the moral weight of Nazi crimes. A closer view shows, however, that the Federal Republic was extremely hard-nosed toward Poland; it demanded emigration rights for ethnic Germans while refusing to offer restitution payments. Brandt’s Germany looked forward, not backward.

Helmut Schmidt’s Germany helped to found several multilateral institutions in the mid-1970s. Chapter 14 opens with the European Council, a thrice-annual gathering of EC-9 leaders that reasserted the primacy of European nation-states over supranational governance. Schmidt reconciled with Britain, acceding to the Regional Fund in hopes of swaying a British referendum on EC membership. The CSCE summit, held in Helsinki, was a milestone for East-West détente – though Bonn’s relations with the USSR remained strained, even as improvements with Poland were achieved. The Federal Republic fell into recession, and Schmidt fretted about Global South proposals for a New International Economic Order. Bonn’s response was to court major countries individually, highlighting Germany’s interest in positive trade relations while loosening controls on weapons exports and nuclear commerce. Economic anxiety also animated Schmidt’s urgent demands on allies to cooperate in staving off protectionism. Informal coordination with Britain, France, and the United States became commonplace, a more structured grouping, the G-7 (adding Japan, Italy, and soon Canada), reestablished confidence in Western leadership.

Chapter 12 shows how the Federal Republic’s booming economy created new challenges and expectations. Currency crises wracked the West, leading to the final breakdown of the Bretton Woods order. Together with other leaders of the newly expanded EC of Nine, Brandt and finance minister Helmut Schmidt instituted a “joint float” of European currencies (excluding Britain, Ireland, and Italy). The Nixon administration tried to slow the EC’s momentum by proposing a “Year of Europe” that would cement U.S. leadership; Bonn was again caught between the United States and France, with both countries fearing that West Germany had become “Finlandized” as a result of its Ostpolitik. Brezhnev’s visit to Bonn, along demands raised by Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania, showed that West German prosperity had raised expectations of financial generosity. Brandt’s Germany began to play a more visible role in Middle Eastern diplomacy, and in September East and West Germany were finally able to join the United Nations. The EC-9 undertook steps toward greater coordination of foreign policy, particularly at the UN, and Brandt insisted that West Germany was there to act as a European power.

Chapter 4 covers the first year of Reagan’s presidency. Living up to conservative expectations, his administration embarked upon the most hardline, anti-communist agenda in at least two decades. To compel the Soviets to negotiate on arms control, Reagan would oversee the largest peacetime military buildup in American history. But there was little evidence of any strategy to complement the buildup. The Reagan administration engaged in anti-Soviet rhetoric, rejected the idea of a summit with Brezhnev, and refused to offer any serious arms control proposals. The confrontational approach raised US–Soviet tensions during 1981. This chapter also discusses Reagan’s support for the Contras in Nicaragua, which prompted resistance from Democrats in Congress, culminating in the Boland Amendment of late 1982. Finally, the chapter analyzes the crisis in Poland, which saw the imposition of martial law amid the movement led by Solidarity (a non-communist trade union). I discuss the complex factors behind Reagan’s response: his ideological beliefs, European–Soviet trade relations, the influence of the AFL-CIO, and conservative criticism.

Chapter 2 examines the period from January to October 1979. Domestic troubles spiralled during Carter’s third year at the White House. An economic recession, mounting inflation (resulting from a new oil crisis), and intraparty disagreements all undermined support for the president. Together they conjured images of an administration in turmoil. As the year progressed, the idea of “national weakness” gained traction – invoked by opponents of Carter’s foreign and defense policies. In 1979 Carter came under further pressure to align foreign policy with his political needs. His decision to approve the production of the MX program appeared perverse in light of everything that had preceded it. Here was a notable policy departure, veering well beyond the sort of compromise or rhetorical device that Carter had been forced to deploy earlier in his presidency. Soon after, the bungled US response to the “discovery” of a Soviet brigade in Cuba undermined relations with Moscow, just weeks after the Vienna summit. The political maneuvering, and the administration’s mishandling of the episode, damaged the prospects for ratification of the SALT II Treaty.