We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 6 parses the explanatory factors that account role as a constrainer and taker in the human rights regime.It also explores Beijing’s cooperation with other-like minded countries as a secondary influence on its behavior.It argues that the two most prominent explanatory variables were the CCP-government’s antipathy for scrutiny of its record and its preexisting ideas that stressed state sovereignty and local conditions, which caused Beijing to take positions that limited the authority and scope of the human rights regime.At the same time, I show that image concerns had an important restraining effect, inclining the PRC toward more cooperative stances.
Chapter four examines China’s role during the establishment of a new body to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights.It investigates China’s behavior in the UNCHR, which it joined in 1982, and the impact of Tiananmen as a watershed event that altered the PRC’s relationship with the regime.It then examines Beijing’s positions in reforming the UN human rights body and replacing the Commission with the Council beginning with the first reform proposals in 2004 to the final stage when Human Rights Council members engaged in an Institution-Building process from 2006 through 2007.Because the Institution-Building Process encompassed reviewing a wide range of human rights procedures, including the individual petition system and the special procedures, this chapter provides an unparalleled glimpse into the PRC’s posture toward a broad array of the regime’s mechanisms.It also chronicles the emergence of the Like-Minded Group in the UN Commission on Human Rights in advancing reform proposals in the mid- to late-1990s.
The concluding chapter reviews China’s constrainer and taker roles and discusses the implications of my findings.I consider the relevance of my findings regarding China’s rise, its behavior within international regimes more generally and the fate of the human rights regime.I argue that the continued strength of image concerns as a moderating influence will be crucial in determining Beijing’s future role in international regimes.Although I demonstrate that the PRC and other nations, especially countries belonging to the Like-Minded Group, contested various elements of the human rights regime, the regime’s lack of meaningful sanctions, means that these countries may be less inclined to mount a challenge but are likely to block efforts to strengthen the regime.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.