In this paper, I revisit a debate between Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Barth, known as the ‘Barth–Feuerbach confrontation’. I begin by framing the contours of this dispute as it was initiated by Barth and carried forward by his interpreters, who have sought in vain to make Barth's and Feuerbach's positions commensurable. Having narrated the history of this ongoing scholarly discussion and clarified why it remains intractable, I turn to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, whose this-worldly conception of theology, I argue, provides resources for ‘mediating’ the insights of Feuerbach and Barth. By attending to Bonhoeffer's earliest engagements with Barth on the question of divine revelation, and by exploring his striking proximity to Feuerbach on the issue of this-worldliness, we can see how Bonhoeffer helps overcome not only the dichotomies that plague the Barth–Feuerbach confrontation but also those that pervade modern attempts to safeguard this-worldliness by dispensing with divine transcendence.

This article examines Karl Barth's engagement with the philosophy of religion of Ludwig Feuerbach. In The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach proposes that religion is a function of human projection and that the Christian concept of God represents the crystallisation in one objectified subject of all the finite perfections of individual human beings. In Church Dogmatics, I/2, Barth seeks to respond to Feuerbach's critique of Christianity by affirming Feuerbach's critical account of the nature of religion but arguing that, since the original impetus of Christianity issues not from human projection but from God's act of self-revelation in Jesus Christ, Feuerbach's critique of religion does not apply to the Christian faith. Glasse notes that this response, whilst satisfactory to the Christian, would be ‘not intelligible’ to those who do not accept the Christian faith. Furthermore, Barth's apologetic manoeuvre, Vogel claims, entails that Barth is unable to defend the plausibility of the Christian faith on the terms set by secular culture, and that Christian theology is therefore required to abandon any attempt to participate constructively in general public discourse. Vogel recognises that this is a drastic recourse indeed, observing that it would be judicious for Christian theology to seek to elaborate a response to Feuerbach's critique which can stand without requiring the critic to assume the veracity of the Christian faith. This article argues that, by taking into account the role of Feuerbach's earlier work, Thoughts on Death and Immortality, for constituting the philosophical impetus of Feuerbach's critique of Christianity, the Christian theologian is able, using Barth's theological anthropology, to provide a response to Feuerbach's critique on Feuerbach's own terms. In Thoughts on Death and Immortality, Feuerbach argues that Protestant Christianity, as the paradigmatic expression of religion, conceives the individual as an absolute being, and that, due to the fact that everyday existence clearly counter-indicates this absolutisation of the human individual, Protestantism posits a second, eternal life, in which the limits bound up with individual existence are eradicated. Using Barth's theological anthropology in Church Dogmatics, III/2 and III/4, this article proposes that Barth concurs with Feuerbach's critique of the absolutisation of the individual, but that he is positioned to deny that this absolutised conception of the individual has anything to do with the Christian faith insofar as he accurately represents it.