Adam Smith promoted free banking—private, competitive, convertible banknotes. He also supported restrictions on banks. We study Smith’s views and the era in which they developed, suggesting his ‘regulations’ were a backstop against banks’ risks to depositors but primarily monetary stability. In modern parlance, Smith supported macroprudential regulations to underpin monetary stability, as did Friedman and Schwartz the US FDIC. We discuss why Smith’s vision for banking went unrealised. Bank regulation became microprudential and ran aground in 2008/2009. The prominence of macroprudential regulation now provides a chance to reorientate regulation to support monetary stability. Early signs are not promising.

This paper estimates a model using Bayesian methods and data from the USA (1990Q1–2019Q2) to explore how the financial sector contributes to business cycles through banks’ asset channel and the quality of capital adequacy constraint. The paper shows that the contribution of financial and non-financial shocks varied before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis; housing demand and asset price shocks are the main contributors, and the credit shocks are the most persistent. In addition, the paper presents the application of macroprudential tools, along with their impact on the economy in general, and on welfare in particular. The findings illustrate that the tools which control household borrowing ability, such as loan-to-value or debt-to-income ratios, do not impact welfare significantly. However, the impact of policies on the leveraged sector is substantial. The paper proposes macroprudential policies that allow policy-makers to stabilize the economy without changing welfare. Such policies, however, should be timely, targeted, and temporary; otherwise, they may cause disruptions.

This paper quantitatively examines the macroeconomic and welfare effects of macroprudential policies in open economies. We develop a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, where banks choose their funding sources (domestic vs. foreign deposits) and are subject to financial constraints. Our model predicts that banks reduce leverage in response to a macroprudential policy tightening, but increasingly rely on foreign funding. This endogenous shifts of funding composition significantly undermine the stabilizing effect and welfare gains of macroprudential policies. Our results also suggest macroprudential policies are less effective in financially more open economies, and optimal policy should take capital flows into consideration. Finally, we find empirical support for the model predictions in a group of developing and emerging economies.

Policymakers need to know if the structure of competition and the degree of banking market concentration change the incidence of financial crises. Previous studies have not always come to clear conclusions. We use a new dataset of 19 countries where we include capital adequacy and house price growth as factors affecting crisis incidence, and we find a positive role for bank concentration in reducing incidence. In addition, we look at New Industrial Economics indicators of market structure and find that increased market power also reduces crisis incidence. We conclude that attempts to increase competition in banking, although welcome for welfare reasons, should be accompanied by increases in capital standards.

This paper investigates how a combination of monetary and macroprudential policies might affect the dynamics of a small open economy (SOE) with financial frictions under alternative discretionary shocks. Discretionary shocks in productivity and domestic and foreign monetary policies identify the roles of alternative interest rate and reserve requirement rules to stabilize the economy. The model is calibrated for the Brazilian economy. The exchange rate channel of transmission is relevant for foreign but not for domestic shocks. The interest rate rule should target domestic inflation and should not react to the exchange rate. The countercyclical reserve requirements rule, in its turn, should aggressively react to the credit-gap and not include a fixed component. Under both domestic and foreign shocks, the countercyclical effectiveness of the macroprudential policy improves when the degree of openness increases. There is a complementarity between monetary and macroprudential policy rules to stabilize the SOE.

The paper presents an agent-based model reproducing a stylized credit network that evolves endogenously through the individual choices of firms and banks. We introduce in this framework a financial stability authority in order to test the effects of different prudential policy measures designed to improve the resilience of the economic system. Simulations show that a combination of micro- and macroprudential policies reduces systemic risk but at the cost of increasing banks’ capital volatility. Moreover, the agent-based methodology allows us to implement an alternative meso regulatory framework that takes into consideration the connections between firms and banks. This policy targets only the more connected banks, increasing their capital requirement in order to reduce the diffusion of local shocks. Our results support the idea that the mesoprudential policy is able to reduce systemic risk without affecting the stability of banks’ capital structure.

Anticipating a bailout in the event of a crisis distorts financial intermediaries’ incentives in multiple dimensions. Bailout payments can, for example, lead intermediaries to issue too much short-term debt while simultaneously underinvesting in liquid assets. To correct these distortions, policymakers may choose to regulate the composition of both the assets and liabilities of intermediaries. I examine these regulations in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig [(1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 401–419] model with limited commitment. I demonstrate that, contrary to common wisdom, introducing a minimum liquidity requirement can increase intermediaries’ susceptibility to a run by their investors.

Recent papers point to the problem that inflation-targeting models do not as of yet consider financial market stability that can considerably derail inflation-targeting monetary policy, implying significant nonzero crisis probabilities that could come along with large negative output and employment gaps. Credit flows and the instability of credit appear to be at the root of the financial instability problem. On the other hand, some authors recently questioned whether a too early and too strong leaning against the wind policy by central banks might have higher costs than benefits in terms of output and employment losses. In our paper, we include in an inflation targeting model a financial stabilization goal. In contrast to infinite horizon and two-period models, we propose a finite horizon model. The model is solved by using a new global solution algorithm, called Nonlinear Model Predictive Control (NMPC), exploring stabilizing/destabilizing effects of price and nonprice (credit volume) drivers of the output gap, inflation, and credit flows. We substantiate the theoretical part of the paper by approaching the subject empirically, relying to that end on a regime-switching structural vector autoregressive (VAR) for the euro area. The empirical model contains standard macroeconomic variables along with credit flows and loan interest rates, the central bank policy rate, and European Central Bank (ECB) balance sheet variables. The regime-switching feature of the model is meant to capture the state-dependent relationship between the variables, with specific nonlinearities having direct counterparts in the theoretical model. Based on a sign restriction methodology, we explore conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks, loan supply, and demand shocks, under different regime assumptions to reveal the state-dependent effects of both interest rate and volume-based policies. The empirical results are used as guidance for the calibration of the theoretical model variants.

Economists understand that a fit for purpose policy regime requires a reliable general equilibrium model of the system in question and a well specified description of the objectives that the policymaker is trying to pursue. The current financial stability regime has neither and without these critical foundations the regime is fundamentally fragile and incomplete. There is no anchor on the conduct of policy, an absence in genuine accountability and, as a result, reputational risks for policy institutions.

In this paper, I analyze the ability of monetary policy to stabilize both the macroeconomy and financial markets under two different scenarios: fixed- and variable-rate mortgages. I develop and solve a new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) that features a housing market and a group of constrained individuals who need housing collateral to obtain loans. A given share of constrained households borrows at a variable rate, whereas the rest borrow at a fixed rate. I consider two alternative ways of introducing a macroprudential approach to enhancing financial stability: one in which monetary policy, using the interest rate as an instrument, responds to credit growth; and a second one in which the macroprudential instrument is instead the loan-to-value ratio (LTV). The results show that when rates are variable, a countercyclical LTV rule performs better in stabilizing financial markets than monetary policy. However, when rates are fixed, even though monetary policy is less effective in stabilizing the macroeconomy, it does a good job in promoting financial stability.

Financial supervision focuses on the aggregate (macroprudential) in addition to the individual (microprudential). But an agreed framework for measuring and addressing financial imbalances is lacking. We propose a holistic approach for the financial system as a whole, beyond banking. Building on our model of financial amplification, the financial cycle is the key variable for measuring financial imbalances. The cycle can be curbed by leverage restrictions that might vary across countries. We make concrete policy proposals for the design of macroprudential instruments to simplify the current framework and make it more consistent.

There is increasing recognition that prior to the global financial crisis financial regulation had lacked a macroprudential perspective. There has since been a strong effort to make a new macroprudential orientation operational, including through the establishment of new macroprudential authorities or ‘committees’ in a number of jurisdictions. These developments raise — and this paper explores — the following three questions. First, what distinguishes macroprudential policy from microprudential policy and what are its key tasks? Second, what powers should be given to macroprudential authorities and what should be their mandate? Third, how can governance arrangements ensure that macroprudential policies are pursued effectively? While arrangements for macroprudential policy will to some extent be country-specific, we identify three basic challenges in setting up an effective macroprudential policy framework and discuss options to address them.

The recent Sub-Prime crisis has prompted a close focus on the causes of financial instability as well as the issue of whether it can be prevented. There is a growing realisation that the Sub-Prime crisis, although having some important unique features, also had a number of generic aspects in common with earlier financial crises, of which a large number have been seen in recent decades. Accordingly, the crisis has prompted a debate about macroprudential policy, which focuses on the financial system as a whole, treating aggregate risk as endogenous with regard to collective behaviour of institutions. Our survey shows that a great deal of progress has been made in ‘macroprudential surveillance’ and related research on causes and predictors of crises. Much less progress has been made in ‘macroprudential regulation’, the design and implementation of policies to prevent or mitigate threatened crises.