This chapter focuses on the theme of dignity as a human right. There is first a brief general review of a few relevant philosophical debates about human dignity and human rights that are concerned with societal progress in the way karama as a human right, was sometimes interpreted by protesters. Then, the chapter moves on to a closer look at a postcolonial review of similar debates. After reviewing some relevant passages from interviews and other expressions of karama as a human right in Egypt, the chapter ends with an overall analysis of this specific theme in light of the material previously presented.

The concept of sustainability explained in Chapter 2 is further developed in terms of human capabilities proposed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Human capabilities are defined as “real freedoms that people have reasons to value.” Some of these capabilities may be quite elementary, such as being adequately nourished and escaping premature mortality, while others are more complex, such as having the literacy required to participate actively in political life. In contrast to utility-based and resource-based approaches (that is, utilitarianism and Rawls’s theory of justice, respectively), human capabilities provide a robust informational basis for interpersonal comparisons that is necessary to reduce injustices and advance good societies. They are relevant for all types of capital (natural, economic, human and social) as well as for private and public goods and wealth.

After reviewing how Sen’s and Nussbaum’s works have incorporated religion in the capability approach through religious narratives and teachings, the chapter furthers this engagement by exploring the contribution of specific religious narratives and teachings to public reasoning and capability expansion. It does so in reference to the Catholic tradition and the global socio-ecological crisis. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section overviews how religion has been addressed in the capability approach literature. Religion, or relation with a higher source of being, has been considered a relevant dimension of well-being, an important source of agency, and an influence in the formation of people’s values. The second section introduces the relational anthropological dimension of the capability approach. It discusses how the Christian narrative of the parable of The Sower can enhance the universal reach of the capability approach and expand its notion of relationships. The third section highlights the connection between individual choices and social structures, as well as the need for motivational attitudes for transforming and removing injustices. It does so through the religious contribution of the latest social teaching of the Catholic tradition, the papal encyclical Laudato Si’: On the Care of our Common Home.

The first part of this paper looks into the question of Lucretius’ philosophical sources and whether he draws almost exclusively from Epicurus himself or also from later Epicurean texts. I argue that such debates are inconclusive and likely will remain so, even if additional Epicurean texts are discovered, and that even if we were able to ascertain Lucretius’ philosophical sources, doing so would add little to our understanding of the DRN. The second part of the paper turns to a consideration of what Lucretius does with his philosophical sources. The arguments within the DRN are not original. Nonetheless, the way Lucretius presents these arguments establishes him as a distinctive philosopher. Lucretius deploys non-argumentative methods of persuasion such as appealing to emotions, redeploying powerful cultural tropes, and ridicule. These methods of persuasion do not undercut or displace reasoned argumentation. Instead, they complement it. Lucretius’ use of these methods is rooted in his understanding of human psychology, that we have been culturally conditioned to have empty desires, false beliefs and destructive emotions, ones that are often subconscious. Effective persuasion must take into account the biases, stereotypes and other psychological factors that hinder people from accepting Epicurus’ healing gospel.

This chapter reviews the material presented in this book, including the history of novel legal doctrines; the use of libel law for political purposes; the interrelationship between politicians, media, and political followers; and the recurring debates over the ethics of comment from a distance. Goldwater was so far ahead of his time in understanding the political value of lawsuits that he anticipated the conservative legal movement of the 1980s. I then propose an alternative approach to the Goldwater Rule, drawing on the work of philosophers James Madison, John Rawls, Jacques Mauritain, and Martha Nussbaum to argue for a more liberal and tolerant guideline for psychiatric comment on public figures. The APsaA, in response to the Fact episode of 1964, adopted such a guideline under President Heinz Kohut. The result was a respectful and ethically coherent stance that has stood the test of time. Instead of banning comment outright as the APA’s Goldwater Rule does – a form of coercive paternalism in the sense described by philosopher Sarah Conley and others – I argue that the psychiatric community should respect the conscience of the individual psychiatrist acting in good faith.