This chapter traces the different uses of the term φοῖνιξ / Φοῖνιξ, the cognate adjectives φοινικός and φοινικοβαφής, and verb φοινίττω, running from this last’s allusive use to describe Theagenes’ bloodstained cheek at the beginning of Book 1 to the revelation at the novel’s close that its writer is a Φοῖνιξ, ‘Phoenician’. Ι noted how these uses span the word’s range of meanings – crimson, date, palm, Phoenician – and how Phoenicia’s importance is augmented by the mysteriously unnamed Tyrian’s victory at Delphi and by the description of the ship on which the trio escape as Φοινίκιον … φιλοτέχνημα, ‘a Phoenician masterpiece’ (5.18), a mis-en-abyme of the literary masterpiece which transports the couple from Delphi to Meroe.

Addressing the barriers we put in the way of our writing. The need to be prepared to experiment: all landmark fiction has tried something that hasn’t been tried before. Understanding that ‘failure’ is part of the learning process. Don’t listen to inhibiting inner voices: there is nothing you’re not allowed to write and you can always edit later. Allow yourself substandard drafts – then you have something to build on.

‘Accept the difficulties, expect things to be initially unsatisfactory, and start writing.’

Models the structure and content for the five following jurisdiction-specific chapters, pointing out that the separation of church and state was established as an explicit requirement and explains the context that gave rise to the free exercise and anti-establishment clauses. Explores the policy background, outlines the contemporary relevant legal framework, as governed by statutory and constitutional provisions, noting the extent to which the country is a signatory state to relevant international law. Considers the genesis of the state neutrality principle in the anti-establishment clause as confirmed by decisions of the US Supreme Court. It delves into the religion-related case law to identify the principle’s bearing on the rights to freedom of religion, of conscience, expression and association, examines how it relates to equality law. It focuses on the various tests successively applied by the USSC in its efforts to police the church–state boundary. It identifies and discuses some different academic views, including the Habermas argument that “the principle of separation of Church and State demands that the institution of the State operates with strict impartiality”.

The chapter argues that conscientious exemptions should not be granted to providers of commercial goods and services from the prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination on the basis that LGB people would thereby be treated by the law as second-class citizens. The chapter rejects the charge that the right to non-discrimination would consequently be prioritized over general right and that those that oppose homosexuality would be treated as second-class citizens. The majority of the chapter is devoted to showing that several fundamental rights (i.e. non-discrimination, association and expression) prohibit the state from treating those that oppose homosexuality as second-class citizens. Consequently, given the balancing of rights and harms involved, the right to non-discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation will prevail in certain circumstances while the general right to conscientious exemption will prevail in others.