Regional integration blocs are subject to the admission of new members, which must be approved by domestic institutions. This article analyzes how the incorporation of Venezuela and Bolivia into Mercosur passed in the Paraguayan Congress. While the first case lasted from 2007 to 2013, demonstrating parliamentary opposition, the second episode took place between 2015 and 2016, suggesting convergence between the executive and legislative branches on the issue. Using process tracing, the unveiled mechanism shows how government and opposition forces act to alter the duration of the bill in Congress and that political parties have a pendular behavior according to political cleavages. Moreover, the findings of this study suggest the existence of a parliamentary veto power in foreign affairs and the importance of having homogeneous coalitions to achieve faster approvals.

This Article criticizes two trends on the Brazilian literature of communitarian law: A mental exercise that can only be termed as an “EU analogy” and a need to evoke the Congress of Panama of 1826 as the origin of Mercosur. As odd as it may seem, those trends are somewhat connected. Comparisons between the European Union and Mercosur abound in scholarly works, and they became so popular that a more simplified version of this comparison came into being. When explaining the current dilemma that Mercosur faces—or any other predicament as well—Brazilian scholars often tend to provide only one solution consisting in a vague reference to the supranational character of the European Union. This reference appears out of context and solves any problem. A trend so common as the EU analogy exemplifies that some Brazilian experts on communitarian law have also assumed an idealized version of our neighbors’ take on the Latin America integration. Apparently, Mercosur dates back to the Congress of Panama of 1826 and Simón Bolívar’s ideals on Latin American integration. The story faces several historical obstacles and yet has spread so rapidly that it has acquired the stature of a true myth. This work presents these two inclinations and contends that one relies on the other. Rather than providing an accurate explanation, as one would expect on a scientific text, they justify a certain concealed intent. This Article employs an inductive method of approach and relies on primary sources to explain the foundational myth so to prevent historical misconceptions.

This article examines the influence of subnational economic interests on the formation of supranational trade policy in the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). Accounting for differences in the relative importance of member countries, the article argues that subnational economic interests influenced the structure of Mercosur’s common external tariff (CET). Although the CET was negotiated without direct input from voters or legislators, its structure reflects the interests of geographically specific economic interests in the member countries. The results of a regression analysis of tariffs toward nonmembers indicate that the economic composition of subnational political jurisdictions shaped the structure of the CET. These findings suggest that by overlooking subnational economic interests, much of the current literature on the evolution of Mercosur misses a critical aspect of the policymaking process.

Democratic consolidation was the top priority of re-democratized Argentina and Brazil. Regional integration was also part of this goal from two perspectives: from the outside, through a treaty that diminished the scope for political manoeuvring by the military and increased international support for the incumbent administrations, and; from within, through encouragement of a proactive role for business in integration that would give it democratic legitimacy, while, at the same time, exercising democratic practices. Argentine and Brazilian political classes expected to combine these two aspects but soon had to face business reluctance. Government-business relations in the construction of Mercosur reflected government attempts to balance the trade-off between the approaches from without and from within. Although business was largely excluded from the strategic formulation of integration, in a democratic context, governments have to accommodate societal interests. This occurred through a significant overlap between powerful business interests and the executive's plans. The achievement of integration helped consolidate democracy and the choices made by political elites drove forward the democratic process.

This paper discusses how MNCs reacted to NAFTA and MERCOSUR in terms of their investment and operations patterns in three sectors - automotive, electronics, and apparel - and assesses the likely impact of the upcoming Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). It shows that NAFTA functioned – at least in its first years - as an investment relocation engine, while MNCs' reaction to MERCOSUR was significant only in the automotive sector. The emergence of China and other Asian economies, with their low cost and vast markets, and the progressive enlargement in the scope of MNCs operations, seem to diminish the economic relevance of NAFTA and MERCOSUR. FTAA may provide a new impetus to the integration of the automotive industry in the Americas, and a stronger rationale for a slowdown of plant relocation to Asia in light industries such as electronics and garments. But it is unlikely that it will reverse current trends which point to Asia – with China at the epicenter – as the global magnet for manufacturing and exports.

In trade policy France ranks as one of the most protectionist countries in the European Union. From an outside perspective, the French attitude is usually explained as a consequence of the strength and influence of the agrarian lobby. The article argues that farm groups in France have lost their formerly privileged position and the power to pursue their interests politically. A closer look at domestic politics shows that agricultural reforms were successfully implemented against the opposition of the farm lobby during the last ten years. But at the same time, French policy-makers were keen to create the impression that they were unable to make concessions in international trade talks due to the resistance of the agricultural sector. The EU-Mercosur negotiations demonstrate how the French government fended off demands for liberalization using farm interests as bargaining chips.

We evaluate the effectiveness of the MERCOSUR's network of protected areas in representing South America's ecoregions. The region contains 1,219 non-overlapping protected areas covering nearly 2,000,000 km2. Fifty percent of the reserves are <100 km2 and 75% <1,000 km2. Less than a half of the 75 ecoregions in the MERCOSUR have at least 10% of their area within protected areas, and only 13 when just reserves in IUCN categories I–IV are considered. In general, forests are better represented than other biomes. At the national level the network of protected areas in Uruguay is the least developed in the region, with those of Bolivia and Chile the most developed. For 10% of each ecoregion to be protected at least another 500,000 km2 would have to be incorporated into the network. Such expansion would be more efficient if conservation priorities are identified using a regional approach. This is of particular relevance for the cost-efficient protection of the 20 ecoregions that are shared by two or more countries. While only c. 20% of the ecoregions found in Brazil are shared with other countries, >75% of the ecoregions in Bolivia, c. 70% in Argentina, >60% in Chile, and all the ecoregions in Paraguay and Uruguay are shared with other countries. Overall, although it currently covers 14% of the region, the network of protected areas of the MERCOSUR still performs poorly in protecting its ecoregions.

The present article describes the institutional structure and dispute settlement system within the Common Market of the South. It analyses the first arbitral award given by the first ad hoc tribunal established within the Common Market of the South and discusses the award's implications for the Common Market's law and institutions.