John Stuart Mill does not contradict himself in On Liberty with respect to the issue of piecework, contrary to Dale E. Miller's charge that he does. Miller fails to understand that the liberty principle (LP) limits society's authority to regulate trade in that society has no legitimate authority to prohibit or make unduly expensive a buyer's post-trade use of his purchased product in self-regarding ways. LP gives an employer who has purchased labor under a trade contract in a free and fair competitive labor market a right to conclude a separate mutually consensual self-regarding piecework contract with any skilled worker already in his employ.

This review locates Asha Bhandary's Freedom to Care in the history of philosophy, notes some of the theory's distinctive features that clearly advance the care theory tradition, and raises some puzzles and questions regarding specific elements of the theory. My remarks focus mostly on Part I of the book and on the following four topics: (1) Bhandary's Rawlsian roots, (2) Bhandary's engagement with Eva Feder Kittay, (3) Bhandary's choice of J. S. Mill and John Rawls as her main historical interlocutors, and finally, (4) Bhandary's methodological choice of ‘men/fathers,’ ‘women/mothers,’ and ‘children/girls/boys’ as the main focus of much of her analysis.

This paper offers an interpretation of the behavioural evidence that casts doubt over whether people always have preferences or, if they do, that they are stable. If people do not have preferences in this sense, then the usual policy evaluation standard of preference satisfaction cannot be used in these cases. The paper then develops, to fill this gap, a Millian policy framework where policy is judged by whether it advances what Mill understands by individual liberty in On Liberty. This yields many recognisable policies but offers a different evaluative standard for them. It also yields some policy innovations: e.g. a basic income and a flat tax.

Mill advocated an unqualified defense of the liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, which he understood to include not just the freedom to hold but also to express any opinion or sentiment. Yet considerable dispute persists about the nature of Mill’s argument for freedom of expression and whether his premises can support so strong a conclusion. Two prominent interpretations of Mill that threaten to undermine his uncompromising defense of free speech are considered and refuted. A better interpretation can be founded on Mill’s claim that the liberties of conscience are inseparable in practice. This claim can be defended with modern psychological insight about the nature of cognitive bias, and epistemological insight about why justification of creedal beliefs requires the universal toleration of opinion, insights which are largely anticipated by Mill. This argument is especially vital because it highlights the divide between classical liberalism and progressivism that has become a flashpoint in the current political debate over free speech.

Liberal utilitarianism is usually presented as a current of thought mostly inspired by Jeremy Bentham and other Western European thinkers, and eventually diffused in other parts of the world. This paper adopts a different approach and shows, on the one hand, how the Bentham brothers’ experiences in Russia and serfdom in particular inspired their invention of the Panopticon. The latter was not related to deviance (Foucault's interpretation), but to labor organization and surveillance. On the other hand, the interplay between utilitarianism and colonial India led Bentham, then James and John Stuart Mill, and ultimately Henry Maine to revise utilitarianism, in particular the relationship between law, labor, and political economy. In both the Britain–Russia interplay and Britain–India interplay, the tension between universalism and particularism of philosophical, social and economic categories was at work.

McCabe and Turner raise a number of perceptive points concerning my treatment of John Stuart Mill's political economy of progress and its relation to socialism. In giving context to their points this article first tries to clarify Mill's understanding of socialism as anchored in his positive classical economics. Mill the utilitarian philosopher endorses socialism, but he anticipates its arrival based on his materialist understanding of history. In this materialist context, the article argues that Mill expects the economy of worker cooperatives to advance from one focused on relational equality to one focused on luck egalitarianism. This shift is again supported by Mill's own utilitarian principles, but it is ultimately the product of what he anticipates will be the political economy of the cooperative mode of production.

This essay defends deliberative democracy by reviving a largely forgotten idea of corruption, which I call “cognitive corruption”—the distortion of judgment. I analyze different versions of this idea in the work of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bentham, and Mill. Historical analysis also helps me rethink orthodox notions of corruption in two ways: I define corruption in terms of public duty rather than public office, and I argue that corruption can be both by and for political parties. In deliberative democracy, citizens can take off their party hats and may be more influenced by the force of the better argument than in party democracy.

The epistemic approach to liberalism not only clarifies some of the core features of progress-based arguments for liberty. For two reasons it provides grounds for doubting those arguments’ persuasiveness. The first reason emerges from the epistemic liberal explanation of economic recessions and of social regress as necessary consequences of our enjoying the individual liberty to adapt to our circumstances. Precisely because it secures personal choice with respect to the ends of life and the means to pursue them, liberty must be construed as at best necessary for the imperfect and costly realization of the interest individuals may have in personal advancement. Second, and in revealing the underlying logic of the economic and cultural processes that liberty makes possible, epistemic liberalism shows that it is to the notion of complex adaptation that we must look when seeking to evaluate the overall or aggregate results of liberty. Crucially, however, this means rejecting the notion of progress as fit to perform this ethico-historical evaluative role.

The locality of Langenboom (eastern Noord-Brabant, the Netherlands), also known as Mill, is famous for its Neogene molluscs, shark teeth, teleost remains, birds and marine mammals. The stratigraphic context of the fossils, which have been collected from sand suppletions, was hitherto poorly understood. Here we report on a section which has been sampled by divers in the adjacent flooded sandpit ‘De Kuilen’ from which the Langenboom sands have been extracted. The studied section covers part of the marine Miocene Breda Formation and Pliocene Oosterhout Formation, and is topped by fluvial Quaternary deposits of presumably the Beegden Formation. The Breda Formation (15 – 18 m below lake surface) in this section is, based on organic walled dinoflagellate cysts, of an early-middle Tortonian age. The Oosterhout Formation (7 – 15 m below lake surface) comprises two depositional sequences, the lower of which (12 – 15 m below lake surface) presumably is the source of most Langenboom fossils. Combined dinoflagellate cyst and benthic mollusc indicators point to an early Zanclean - early Piacenzian age for this lower cycle. Its basal transgressive lag and (to lesser extent) top comprise reworked Tortonian taxa as well, Dinoflagellate cysts and a single benthic mollusc point to a Piacenzian age for the upper Oosterhout Formation sequence (7 – 12 m below lake surface).