With the Iran–Iraq conflict and the Cold War coming to an end, the US–Iran relationship appeared to warm as each country no longer faced the existential threats that had once consumed them. With the death of Khomeini, Iran also found itself at a crucial juncture as more pragmatic figures came to the fore. The ascent of new leadership marked a more pragmatic turn for Iran. Meanwhile, in the US, George H.W. Bush attempted to usher the US into the post–Cold War world, and seemed more eager than his predecessor to engage with Iran. Time would not be on his side, however, and other priorities – especially the revolutions in Eastern Europe and Operation Desert Storm – distracted Bush from making any significant steps toward rapprochement. His successor, Bill Clinton, did nothing to better the relationship in his first term, but with the surprise election of the reformist Mohammad Khatami the two rival nations began warming to the prospect of serious engagement. Despite some initial gestures and successful Track II diplomatic exchanges, however, time and expectations again would become factors and the decade would close without concrete agreements.

Chapter 3 examines the 1993 (Rafsanjani), 1997 and 2001 (Khatami) elections, with a view to highlighting the departure from the three elements of Khomeini’s revolutionary religiosity. This shift was evidently influenced by major events of the time: the end of Iran’s eight-year war with Iraq, the death of Khomeini in 1989 and the rise of his successor, Ali Khamenei. These major events opened up Iran’s socio-political environment beyond the contours Khomeini’s revolutionary discourses of jihad, martyrdom, the afterlife and ascetic equality. During this period, and in line with the processes of secularization, the meaning of Islam was reappropriated and infused with new meaning. It was conveyed as a religion of free-thinking, welfare, prosperity, peace and life, as opposed to jihad, martyrdom and poverty as expressed in the revolution’s first decade.