West Nile virus (WNV) is a mosquito-borne neurotropic viral pathogen maintained in an enzootic cycle between mosquitoes (vectors) and birds (natural hosts) with equids, humans, and other vertebrates acting as dead-end hosts. WNV activity in Mexico has been reported in several domestic and wild fauna and in humans, and the virus has been isolated from birds, mosquitoes, and humans. However, no serological studies have been conducted in monkeys, and only two in a limited number of crocodiles (Crocodylus moreletii). Here we present data on the prevalence of neutralizing antibodies against WNV in 53 healthy wild monkeys (49 Ateles geoffroyi and four Alouatta pigra), and 80 semi-captive healthy crocodiles (60 C. acutus and 20 C. acutus–C. moreletti hybrids) sampled during 2012. None of the monkey sera neutralized WNV, whereas 55% of the crocodile sera presented neutralizing antibodies against WNV. These results can contribute to the design of surveillance programmes in Mexico.

Our book examines the mechanisms that underlie social behavior and communication in East African vervet monkeys. Our goal is to describe the sophistication of primate intelligence and to probe its limits. We suggest that vervets and other primates make good primatologists. They observe social interactions, recognize the relations that exist among others, and classify relationships into types. Monkeys also use sounds to represent features of their environment and compare different vocalizations according to their meaning. Monkeys may use abstract concepts and have motives, beliefs, and desires, however, their mental states are apparently not accessible: They do not know what they know. In addition, monkeys seem unable to attribute mental states to others: They lack a “theory of mind.” Their inability to. examine their own mental states or to attribute mental states to others severely constrains their ability to transmit information or to deceive one another. It also limits the extent to which their vocalizations can be called semantic. Finally, the skills that monkeys exhibit in social behavior are apparently domain specific. For reasons that are at present unclear, vervets exhibit adaptive specializations in social interactions that are not extended to their interactions with other species (although they should be).

A representation is a remnant of previous experience that allows that experience to affect later behavior. This paper develops a metatheoretical view of representation and applies it to issues concerning representation in animals. To describe a representational system one must specify the following: the domain or range of situations in the represented world to which the system applies; the content or set of features encoded and preserved by the system; the code or transformational rules relating features of the representation to the corresponding features of the represented world; the medium, or the representation's physical instantiation; and the dynamics, or how the system changes with time. In part because of the behaviorist assumption that the hypothetical, covert changes occurring in an organism during learning correspond to the overt physical changes that are observed, issues of representation in animal behavior have been largely ignored as irrelevant or misleading. However, it can be inferred that representations, acting as models of environmental regularities, operate at many levels of behavioral functioning, both cognitive and noncognitive. Objections to the use of this concept in explanations of animal behavior, based on the claim that it is indeterminate and on behaviorist considerations of parsimony, can be answered. Animal representations may be specialized in terms of tasks and species. Data from tasks involving spatial memory, delayed matching-to-sample, and sequence learning suggest some foundations for a general theory of animal representations.

The role of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) as seed dispersers in the Kibale Forest Reserve of western Uganda was assessed by analysing 1849 dung samples from two chimpanzee communities and by conducting germination trials on dispersed and non-dispersed seeds. Of the chimpanzee dung samples, 98.5% contained seeds, and fig seeds were the most common. The number of large seeds (>2 mm) per dung sample was often high, even for species with a relatively large seed. For example, Mimusops bagshawei has a 15-mm diameter seed and had an average of 26.5 seeds per sample. In addition, many seed species were found in the dung repeatedly over several months. Germination trials demonstrated that the species of seed commonly collected from dung were viable. Comparisons of both the rate and success of germination of chimpanzee-dispersed seeds with seeds collected directly from the parent trees, showed that gut passage increased the speed and probability of germination. The number of large seeds dispersed by the chimpanzee population was estimated at 369 large seeds km-1 day-1. We suggest that in Kibale, chimpanzees may play a more significant role in primary seed dispersal than implied by their low numbers and biomass.

A high-diversity primate community consisting of 13 species was examined at an entirely undisturbed and remote terra firme forest near the headwaters of the Urucu River, Amazonas, Brazil. Twelve of these species used a 900-ha study plot, located 4 km or more inland from the river, and comprised a total group density of 16 groups km−2, an overall density of 146 individuals km−2, a crude community biomass of 381 kg km−2, and a metabolic biomass of 278 kg0.75 km−2. These species were occasionally found together within small (≥1 km2) areas of forest, so long as they included the full complement of available forest types. More frequently, however, only half the species co-occurred in a single habitat type at any one time, reflecting a relatively consistent pattern of subcommunity spatial organization. Habitat generalist species making extensive, yearround use of the predominant habitat type (high forest), were common, whereas habitat specialists were uncommon to very rare, and confined to minor habitats. Those species coexisting throughout the year in high forest were found to segregate vertically from one another. These and other modal patterns of community structure were disrupted seasonally by long-distance, inland movements by two ‘igapó’ forest species living in large groups – squirrel monkeys and white-face capuchins – to high forest areas, which apparently resulted from a food bottleneck in their habitat. Another species found in large groups – woolly monkeys – also exercised seasonally vagrant movements within the high forest matrix, which coincided with periods of greatest scarcity of mature fleshy fruits.

Fleshy fruits collected from abundant woody plants on the Accra Plains, Ghana, were fed to frugivorous species common in the area. Seeds of each plant species were retrieved from each frugivore species for germination trials, and ingested seeds compared to fresh seeds in germination percentage and rapidity. Altogether 85 plant X animal feeding combinations were attempted. In 73% of trials, ingestion did not affect germination percentage; the remain-ing trials were about equally divided between significant increases and decreases. Ingested seeds had significantly faster germination in 12%, and significantly slower germination in 8%, of the trials. Germination percentages in all samples of fresh seeds ( = 37%) did not differ signifi-cantly from those ingested seeds ( = 31%).

There was a significant association between the effect of ingestion on both germination rapidity and percentage (significantly increased, decreased, or neither) and the plant species involved; there was no such association between the effect of ingestion and the animal species. Animals had inconsistent and frequently negligible effects on germination. Two-way analyses of variance (plants X animals) of germination percentage and of germination improvement showed that plant species were a significant source of variation and animal species were not. The fleshy-fruited plants of this assemblage are not generally dependent upon animals for successful germination of their seeds.

Partial lesions of striate cortex were made in newborn and adolescent or young adult macaque monkeys, one newborn squirrel monkey, and adult squirrel and owl monkeys. After survival times ranging from 3 1/2 weeks to 8 years, the retinas were examined for transneuronal retrograde ganglion cell loss and retinal projections to the dorsal lateral geniculate nucleus, and other targets were examined for changes. After lesions in infant macaque monkeys and long postoperative survivals, nearly 80% of the ganglion cells were lost in the altered portions of the retinas. The degeneration appeared to be exclusively of ganglion cells projecting to the parvocellular layers of the lateral geniculate nucleus, and the loss of this class of cell appeared to be complete or nearly complete for the affected portions of the retina. Cases with shorter survivals showed that nine-tenths of the potential loss occurred within 6 months, and about half of the potential loss took place within one month. In cases where lesions were placed in adolescent and young adult macaque monkeys, the loss also was of ganglion cells projecting to the parvocellular layers. However, the rate of cell loss was slower so that little or no cell loss was apparent after six months, and only one-third to three-fourths of the potential loss occurred within 12–14 months. A cell loss of 22% was measured in the altered portions of the retina of a squirrel monkey lesioned as an infant and surviving for 6 months, but no regions of ganglion cell loss were apparent in the retinas of owl and squirrel monkeys lesioned as adults and surviving as long as two or more years.

We conclude that nearly 80% of the ganglion cells project to the parvocellular layers in macaque monkeys, and that the ultimate survival of these ganglion cells depends on the presence of target neurons in the parvocellular layers. Age is important in that the loss of ganglion cells proceeds rapidly in infant macaque monkeys, but slowly in older animals. Infant New World monkeys, judging from one squirrel monkey, are also susceptible to ganglion cell loss, although apparently at a rate comparable to older macaque monkeys. Finally, adult New World monkeys do not appear to be susceptible to ganglion cell loss. These age and species differences in rates of loss and susceptibility to loss challenge a “sustaining collateral” hypothesis proposed earlier (Weller et al., 1979), and suggest alternatives and modifications.

Parkinson’s disease (PD) is characterized by nigral degeneration of dopaminergic neurons in the pars compacta of the substantia nigra. Rather than treating only the symptomatic aspects of Parkinson’s disease, one may also consider treatments designed to retard, arrest, or even reverse this degenerative process. Such strategies could include preventive or restorative treatments instead of purely palliative treatments. A recent hypothesis states that glutamate output from the subthalamic nucleus (STN) to the substantia nigra contributes to the neurotoxic process underlying dopaminergic cell death in Parkinson’s disease. Furthermore, high-frequency stimulation (HFS) of the STN inhibits neurons resulting in the suppression of their glutamate output. Experiments in both rats and monkeys provide preliminary data supporting this hypothesis. Kainic acid (KA) lesions of the STN prevent the loss of dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra after intrastriatal injection of 6-hydroxydopamine (6-OHDA) in rats, and after systemic administration of MPTP in monkeys. In PD patients, the background level of their disease is evaluated in the off medication/off stimulation state (UPDRS III score), over a period of 5 years. Thirty percent of the patients are stabilized and 18% have persistent improvement of their disease-related impairment. Further experiments are needed, including controlled clinical trials utilizing functional imaging of the dopamine transporters and post-synaptic receptors.

These studies in fetal monkeys and ferrets show that the two fundamental types of thalamic GABA neuron populate the thalamus during widely separated developmental epochs. Those of the ventral thalamus (VT) and epithalamus (ET) appear very early in conjunction with the GABA cells of the substantia nigra, globus pallidus, and pretectum (PT). GABA neurons intrinsic to the dorsal thalamus (DT) appear later, long after proliferative activity has ceased in the wall of the third ventricle, after dorsal thalamic nuclei have differentiated and at the same time as principal neurons are acquiring a glutamatergic phenotype. The exact origins of the two waves of GABA cells are uncertain but some appear to arrive from extrinsic sources that include the ganglionic eminence (GE) of the basal forebrain.

Monkey blood samples were collected from 214 monkeys relocated as part of the wildlife rescue organized in French Guiana during the filling of the Petit Saut Dam on the Sinnamary River. These samples were tested for malaria parasites by microscopy of thick blood films and by nested PCR for small subunit rRNA genes (SSUrRNA). Parasitic blood forms similar to Plasmodium brasilianum were detected in 4 monkey species: Alouatta seniculus macconnelli, Saguinus midas midas, Pithecia pithecia and Ateles paniscus paniscus, with the highest prevalence in Alouatta monkeys. PCR was more sensitive than the conventional method for detecting low-grade parasitaemia in positive monkeys. The examination of blood films indicated that 5·6% of the animals carried parasites whereas the nested PCR for ribosomal DNA indicated a prevalence of 11·3%. The P. brasilianum SSUrRNA gene sequence was analysed and aligned with those from P. malariae, P. falciparum and P. vivax. This suggested that P. brasilianum and P. malariae are very closely related. Similar results were obtained from analysis of the sequences in P. malariae and P. brasilianum isolates of a polymorphic gene fragment analogous to the merozoite surface protein-1 (MSP-1) gene of P. falciparum. The P. brasilianum/P. malariae sequences were more similar to those of P. vivax than to those of P. falciparum, at least in the gene region examined. The high degree of DNA homology in the sequences of the SSUrRNA and msp1-like genes is consistent with other characterizations demonstrating a taxonomic relationship between P. brasilianum and P. malariae species. Our results provide further evidence that P. brasilianum and P. malariae are virtually identical and should probably be considered to be a single malaria species. This raises the question as to whether monkeys living in the rainforest are natural reservoirs for both simian and human malaria. These results have implications for the interpretation of the current epidemiological situation in French Guiana.

Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distinguish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses conditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept “see.” Commentators are invited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives.