As in nearly all European Union (EU) policy areas, scholars have turned to analysing the role of national parliaments, in addition to that of the European Parliament (EP), in trade politics. Yet, there is limited understanding of how the parliamentarians at the two levels interact. This article fills the gap by conceptualizing these interactions as a continuum ranging between cooperation, coexistence and competition. We use this continuum to explore multilevel party interactions in EU trade talks and show how cooperation compels politicization – national parliamentarians mainly interact with their European colleagues in salient matters. However, we argue that the impact of politicization on multilevel relations between parliamentarians in the EP and national parliaments is conditioned by party-level factors. Hence, we account for how and why politicization triggers multilevel party cooperation across parliaments in the EU through ideological orientation, government position and policy preferences and show how this takes place in the case of trade.

This article argues that the integration of financial assistance capacity in the eurozone, which was meant to remedy institutional shortcomings and mitigate the distributional implications of financial support in the European Monetary Union (EMU), has instead contributed to a deepening of the existing political cleavages and the creation of new ones. This dysfunctional effect reflects the empowerment of some national parliaments in decisions on financial assistance. These arguments are tested against the empirical examination of the negotiations of the three adjustment programmes for Greece. Specifically, the article shows that negotiations moved towards the radicalization of creditors’ positions and increased divisions between creditors in conjunction with the development of financial assistance capacity. While advancing its theses, the article strikes a note of caution regarding the argument that the empowerment of national parliaments in EU policymaking is one of the most powerful antidotes to its legitimacy deficit and thus a safeguard for the integration project.

Early Warning Mechanism – Principle of Subsidiarity – Lisbon Treaty – Protocol No. 2 on Proportionality and Subsidiarity – A theoretical definition of the Principle of Subsidiarity – The scope of the Principle of Subsidiarity – Scrutiny of the respect for the principle of subsidiarity – The role of national parliaments in the EU legislative procedure – The Swedish Riksdag – national constitutional law – decentralised scrutiny – no selection mechanism – sectoral committees – reasoned opinions – the role of the Plenary – the Committee on the Constitution – method for scrutiny – the principle of proportionality – principle of conferral – legality – European Public Prosecutor’s Office – broad or narrow scrutiny – impact of the Early Warning Mechanism

This article seeks to explore the way in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) has interpreted and applied the principle of democracy. It examines first the democratization process upon which the EU has embarked since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht and how that transformation was a positive reaction to those voices arguing that the EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. Next, it is argued that the CJEU has understood the principle of democracy in a way which is respectful of the two sources of democratic legitimacy at EU level, namely the Member States and the peoples of Europe. Accordingly, that understanding of the principle of democracy is illustrated by some relevant examples taken from the case law of the CJEU and the European General Court (‘EGC’). Those examples show that the CJEU has strived to protect the prerogatives of the European Parliament, the only political institution of the EU whose members have, since 1979, been elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. Yet, they also show that the principle of democracy is not limited to protecting parliamentary prerogatives. That principle, like all EU constitutional principles, pervades the whole of EU law and, as such, must be read in light of societal changes. As democracy within the EU is not limited to the participation by the European Parliament in the legislative process but also encompasses other forms of governance, in particular rule-making by administrative agencies and the achievement of consensus by social partners, it is for the EU judiciary to make sure that those other forms of governance remain as democratic as possible. This can be achieved, inter alia, by making sure that they enjoy sufficient representation or are subject to parliamentary control. Furthermore, the CJEU and the EGC also take into account new mechanisms which seek to strengthen the principle of democracy, such as the principle of transparency. In so doing, they aim to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU by providing sufficient means for EU citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Finally, it is contended that the principle of democracy, as interpreted by the CJEU, draws inspiration from national democracies. In so doing, the CJEU strives to place national and supranational democracies in a mutually reinforcing relationship.

One of the most remarkable results of the elections for the European Parliament on 4–7 June 2009 is that the Swedish Piratpartiet won one seat, to which another will be added if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force. One of the aims of this party is a reform of copyright law to restore the, in its eyes, lost balance between the potentially conflicting interests of creating and spreading culture. The party strives for, among other things, the decriminalisation of all non-commercial copying and use of copyrighted material on the internet.

Irish legal framework on European referendums – Case-law – Judicial activism – No appropriate legislative reaction – Essential scope or objectives test – Constitutional amendment necessary if test not met – Single Act – Pressure for referendum at each new treaty – Political implications – Positive and negative sides of referendums – Referendum-elites – Government sidelined – Equal access to broadcasting – Issues of equality – Diminished role of political parties

Comparative perspective – Guardians of subsidiarity in United States? Not senators, not state legislators – Contrast with EU – EU parliaments do double duty – COSAC – Re-entry of federal courts on the scene – In EU: possible lessening of pressure on European Court – Insufficient time

The Editorial Board has discussed whether it is appropriate to give attention to the Treaty of Lisbon, in view of the uncertainty of its entry into force. We understand that some legal journals are refraining from discussing it until it has become law or at least until the Irish have cleared the way. (…) we hereby present three contributions about that issue:

– Europe's New Realism: The Treaty of Lisbon

Hans-Jürgen Papier

– National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity – Legal Options and Practical Limits

Jean-Victor Louis

– National parliaments and subidiarity: An outsider's view

George A. Bermann

Institutional reforms – The principle of democracy: the European Parliament and the national parliaments – Bypassing unpleasant national debates by taking the European route – Reinforcement of protection of the subsidiarity principle: most valuable reform – Doubts on the effectiveness – Crucial weakness: creeping transfers of competences still possible

Winner: national parliaments or European Parliament? – Differences between Lisbon Treaty and Constitutional Treaty – Latent rivalry – Lisbon innovation – National parliaments now actors in the Union? – Early warning mechanism as solution of compromise – Dual system of the two protocols: yellow and orange cards – Review – Compliance – Interparliamentary co-operation – Complexity of COSAC's involvement – Link between proportionality and subsidiarity – Conception of representative democracy – Position of the Court of Justice

The difference

On 13 December 2007, after a remarkable acceleration of the process under the German and Portuguese presidencies, representatives of the member states put pen to paper and signed the Treaty of Lisbon. Much of the ensuing debate, both in legal circles and among the general public, has centred on its abandonment of the ‘constitutional concept’.

Integration in the European Union jeopardizes our democracy; the European Constitution will not stop the substantial erosion of the constitutional institutions of the member states, in particular the parliaments. It will not put an end to the lack of democracy and of separation of powers, nor to inappropriate centralization. Its rejection in France and the Netherlands creates the opportunity to assign to the Union appropriate and transparent structures close to the citizens.

This is heavy stuff. It is presented to us by authors who are not known to be Euro-phobes or populists. They don't lose themselves in well-meaning clouds of criticism concerning the length of the Constitution, or in putting the blame on ‘the people in Brussels’. Their concerns have to be taken seriously. That is why their suggestions need to be addressed, both as to principle and detail.

Without doubt, the European Union has come to a crossroads. Following the failure of the proposed Constitution in the referendums in France and The Netherlands, it is now vital to take stock of the situation in order to develop an overall concept for how European integration can and should progress from this point. Germany's EU Council Presidency provides an opportunity to hold this discussion. However, the fair-weather talk about Europe, currently being heard from all political sides, is no help at all. People are ill-at-ease and increasingly reserved and sceptical about the European Union, because they can no longer make sense of the integration process, because they can't shake off the feeling of an ever stronger, increasingly inappropriate centralisation of competencies, and because they cannot see who is responsible for which policies. These concerns must be taken very seriously, particularly because they are not simply imaginary.

Minimal constitutional amendment at accession forced constitutional courts in new member states to make great efforts to avoid conflicts with EC and EU law – The importance of expanding the equation of ‘co-operative constitutionalism’ beyond judicial actors, by involving political institutions – The case of constitutional amendment in Estonia and Latvia – The concern over fundamental rights protection versus EC market regulation in Hungary, Estonia and the Czech Republic – Co-operative constitutionalism beyond judicial dialogues.

National parliaments near-universally endorsed in the European Union constitution-building process – Case for national parliaments a composite one: different scholarly approaches and national and European institutions support a greater role for national parliaments for different reasons – The overall endorsement of national parliaments remains a balancing act between competing agendas – Future reforms and treaty-drafting efforts most likely will continue to favour approaches of open-ended political content – No risk for the national governments nor Union institutions.

Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the principle of subsidiarity is to govern the exercise of powers between the European Community and the Member States in areas that do not fall within the exclusive competence of the Community. According to the treaty provision, the principle means that the Community can only take action if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. A similar provision is now part of the draft ‘European Constitution’ 2003; it merely adds that Member State action can be taken at the national, the regional and the local level. Even without this useless supplement, the definition of subsidiarity looks fairly complicated.

It is a popular misunderstanding that European citizens' lack of interest in the European Union has to do with the powers of the European Parliament. These powers have been constantly strengthened over the years, but that did not enhance voters' interest in European affairs. Even with the granting of European citizenship and the introduction of the euro, voters did not get interested, as the low turnout at the elections of members of the European Parliament on June 2004 (less than 45 %) attests. These elections even saw the rise of anti-European parties in several Member States, like the Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom. These elections, however, dealt more with national issues and the confidence in national governments than with European issues.