The introductory chapter sets up the empirical puzzle of the book: Paradoxically, while large swaths of the Israeli electorate have long thought of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as “Mr. Security,” the Israeli security community has for decades viewed him as a security liability. The Israeli public’s general indifference to the years’ long, publicly expressed views of senior veterans of the security establishment is a fascinating and important phenomenon this book aims to explain. The book’s twofold argument is stated here: First, a chasm characterizes the relationship between the Israeli national security community and Netanyahu – on a personal level but also in terms of his approach toward national security; second, that three interconnected trends explain the security establishment’s diminished status in Israeli society: Perceived military debacles since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; the disintegration of the political left in the aftermath of the second Intifada, with the security community being a casualty of the left’s collapse given its association with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and the rise of populist nationalism in Israel. Following a historical survey of civil-military relations in Israel, this chapter concludes with a description of the book’s structure.

Chapter 5 focuses on the rise of populist nationalism in Israel. The collapse of what was once called the “peace camp” at the start of the century opened up the political space for nationalist politicians to link the security establishment with “the failed left” given its close association with the Oslo peace process. The continuous attacks by populist-nationalist politicians on the top echelon of the army and intelligence services must be seen as part of the broader pattern of assaults on state institutions including the courts and the media – all targeted as part of the maligned “leftist” elite. The security officials who have challenged the right’s policies – particularly, its approach toward the Palestinians – have found themselves ostracized and, in some cases, their careers cut short for their so-called “leftist” agenda. Senior veterans of the security establishment, who are more free to speak their minds, have likewise found themselves targeted by populist politicians on the right in an effort to neutralize the criticisms and dire warnings often issued by ex-generals and retired heads of the Mossad and Shin Bet security services.

Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, synthesizes the key themes discussed in this book and summarizes the central conclusions drawn from the empirical research and why they matter. The practical implications of the book’s research findings include potentially open disobedience by the IDF top brass of orders as a developing norm; an ever-escalating clash over values and incongruous visions for Israel’s future between the security community and the messianic religious-right; the delegitimization of institutions that serve as the gatekeepers of Israeli democracy, such as the media, the courts, human rights NGOs, and even the IDF; and significant economic and political repercussions for Israel if it ceases to be a liberal democracy.

Chapter 3 focuses on the policy disagreements with the security community in the period following Netanyahu’s return to power in 2009, a decade after he lost his reelection to Barak. His dismissal of the two-state solution and aggressive settlement policy in the West Bank; his approach toward Hamas-led Gaza; and key aspects of his policy aimed at thwarting Iran’s nuclear program have encountered serious opposition by the security establishment and retired senior security officials. This chapter describes how civil-military tensions spiked following the formation of Netanyahu’s sixth government in December 2022 and its pursuit of its highly controversial legal overhaul.

Netanyahu’s worldview, his modus operandi, and the significant steps he has taken to keep the generals at bay are explored in Chapter 2. It is argued that he is a pragmatic hardliner – a lifelong right-wing ideologue and opponent of Palestinian statehood who nevertheless has displayed flexibility, enabling him to remain coy about his territorial vision for Israel. A master manipulator of the media, he has cultivated an image of himself as “Mr. Security” and sought, early on, to exclude the IDF generals from the decision-making process, associating them with the political left and seeing them as potential rivals. The security community, for its part, sees Netanyahu not as “Mr. Security” but, rather, as a politician who routinely places his personal and political interests ahead of national security concerns.

These were the years of Netanyahu’s reign in power. The Hamas took over the Gaza Strip. Israel went to another was in Lebanon in 2006 and assaulted repeatedly the Gaza Strip as a retaliation for the Hamas war of liberation. The West Bank was domiciled; the peace process dead; and the Knesset passed a number of racist laws against the Palestinian minority in Israel. Israel’s international image was damaged, but it still had the support of governments all around the world.

The Epilogue accounts for Israeli foreign policy since the return to power of Binyamin Netanyahu in 2009. It focuses on Israel’s response to the Arab uprisings, its conflict with Iran, wars with Hamas, rejection of the peace initiatives presented by the Obama administration, Israel’s emerging covert relations with Arab Gulf countries, and Israel’s endorsement of the 2020 Trump peace plan. The chapter traces and explains the concentration of power within the hands of Binyamin Netanyahu, whose premiership has been the main element of continuity in an otherwise changing decision-making forum. The chapter also accounts for the shift of the centerground of Israeli domestic politics and society to the right, and explores the implications of this change for Israeli foreign policy. The chapter ends with a critical evaluation of why Israel’s foreign policy reverted to entrenchment during the previous decade, 2009-2020, and explores its implications for Israel’s foreign relations.

Chapter 8 examines Israel’s regional foreign policy during the first Netanyahu government, in relation to three themes: the peace agreement with Jordan, relations with Syria, and relations with the Arab states in the Gulf. The chapter demonstrates that, during this period, Israel pursued a foreign policy of backtracking on engagement. The warm peace with Jordan became a cooler strategic peace. Relations with the Gulf countries were frozen and the Maghreb states all but severed their ties with Israel. Meanwhile, Syria and Israel were on the brink of war. The retraction from the foreign policy of engagement was entirely in line with the unmitigated hostility of the prime minister and his immediate circle towards the Arab world, and his clear preference for satisfying his core domestic political constituency over advancing the peace process. The chapter adds to the existing literature by exposing the divisions within Israel’s foreign policymakers, in government and the security network, amid the prime minister’s foreign policy of backtracking from engagement.

Chapter 7 traces the rise to power of Binyamin Netanyahu and the ‘presidential’ decision-making structure he established to bypass his ministerial colleagues whom he regarded as his rivals. It explores key events, including the opening of the Hasmonean Tunnel, the October 1996 Washington summit, the signing of the revised Hebron agreement, the construction in Har Homa/Jabal Abu-Ghneim, and the protracted delay in the implementation of the Oslo II agreement. The chapter provides new information concerning the decision-making process in relation to each of these events. In addition, it exposes, for the first time, that Prime Minister Netanyahu rejected an offer from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to replace the Oslo process with Madrid peace conference negotiation framework, which Likud was a part of. It is argued that Israel’s foreign policy reflected Prime Minister Netanyahu’s fundamental opposition to Israel’s engagement foreign policy stance, which he successfully frustrated.