Building on Chapter 5, which established the basis of Iran’s security concerns in Africa, this chapter looks at the reasons for and nature of Iran’s support for Somalia’s Siad Barre in his war against Ethiopia in 1977–78. The chapter examines the complex relationship between the shah’s Iran and the Carter administration, and questions the extent to which the shah’s much-talked-about independent foreign policy was actually independent from US interests and demands. For although the shah wanted to support the Barre regime in Somalia, he was constrained by the United States, which would not allow him to supply US-made weapons to the regime. On the other hand, the shah’s lobbying on behalf of Barre, and his pledges to come to Somalia’s aid if it were attacked by Ethiopia, were taken seriously by, and influenced policy-making decisions in, not only the United States, but also Ethiopia, Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The chapter summarizes the main findings of the study and reiterates its main arguments. It then discusses the continued insurgencies and unrest leading up to the Ogaden-war (1977-1978), pointing to both continuity and change in relation to the 1960s’ insurgency. It also situates the Bale insurgency within more contemporary political developments and pays attention to how various religious reform movements and processes of politicization of ethnicity have added layers of complexity related to ethnicity and religion in today’s Ethiopia. Applying the notions of ethnic and religious objectification, the chapter underscores how the ethnic and religious dimensions of peoplehood became more consciously articulated as separate. The chapter concludes with a few remarks on the broader relevance of the study. It points to how the theoretical framework has proven fruitful for this particular case, allowing for a richer account of the complex dynamics behind the Bale insurrection, while underscoring that it remains relevant for other cases as well.