This chapter outlines the degree of change and continuity that the Obama administration brought to foreign policy and compares it to the Trump administration and its America First foreign policy.

Chapter 3 analyzes President Obama’s announcement on the killing of bin Laden to reveal the way discounting life is authorized and legitimized through extrajudicial, extraterritorial killing. Specifically, Obama’s celebratory narrative of the killing as a nation-healing, nation-securing achievement codes vengeance as “justice,” normalizes US imperialism, implicitly justifies “collateral damage,” and remakes the parameters of legitimate state conduct in relation to terrorism. Attending to how Obama’s announcement used image, narrative, political myth, and sound to manufacture necropolitical law’s authority, legitimacy, norms, and community, Chapter 3 argues that we are interpellated by the official announcement, not as liberal legality’s empowered citizenry but as docile spectator-subjects. Chapter 3 also shows how the announcement, in avoiding the category “law,” enables a lawyer-president-commander-in-chief to invest the category “justice” with a range of meanings that contradict liberal legality, in that they invite us, as subjects, to acquiesce in state secrecy and in necropolitical law’s extraterritorial, extrajudicial violence.

This chapter examines the 9/11 terrorist attack, invasion, regime change in Afghanistan, and the start of the Global War on Terrorism. To secure America from further terrorism, the George W. Bush government invaded the Taliban-ruled mountainous country to destroy Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network. US and NATO forces quickly toppled the Taliban and put al Qaeda to flight by using innovative tactics, anti-Taliban militias, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) The United States and its allies tried to create a democracy where chaos, decentralism, tribal rule, polarization, sectarianism, and a shattered state existed. They installed a democratic government with the help of the United Nations. Many Afghans joyously greeted the new tolerant order. By 2005, Taliban insurgents drifted back from their sanctuaries in Pakistan to raise havoc in rural Afghanistan. From the start, the Pentagon lacked adequate numbers of “boots on the ground” to carry out an effective occupation to ensure stability and security. Other problems plagued the pacification effort, including an ineffective overall nation-building blueprint. Decisively, the Bush administration took its eye off Afghanistan and reduced military and civilian resources for its nation-building endeavors, while it prepared for invasion of Iraq. By the time, George Bush left office in 2009, Afghan counterinsurgency was floundering.

Chapter 4 examines how obscenity is used as a regulatory mechanism by focusing on dead enemy bodies, using the cases of Muammar Qaddafi and Osama bin Laden. Images of violently dead bodies have been circulated and mobilized in the service of the war-on-terror. This framing shapes the understanding of what war is, via which images of war are deemed legitimate grounds for visual consumption. In considering the technologies of erasure in the war-on-terror, images of Qaddafi reinforced the notion of the inevitable failure of dictatorship. The dead body image of Osama bin Laden, on the other hand, was not publicly released despite widespread demand to see it, but its visibility was characterized as a security risk. The chapter elucidates the visual grammar of images that are overtly related to foreign policy actions such as counter-terrorism or democracy promotion. These larger policy discourses are supported and reinforced by the production and circulation of images of dead enemies in particular ways. By the rupture of the dead body taboo, viewers are instructed to engage with images in specific ways, and thus to engage the policy subjects of those images in particular ways, sustaining a larger narrative of security.

An exploration of terrorism through the frameworks offered by a case study on Osama bin Laden’s life and al Qaeda. By understanding bin Laden’s life, motivations, and the operation of al Qaeda as a terrorist organization, we see how understanding human behavior and the logic of violence through an economic lens offers more insight to a solution than a rote labeling of bin Laden, and his followers, as terrorists.

Examines September 11 attacks and the Cold War–style response of George W. Bush. Assesses competing interpretations of 9/11. Outlines Bush Doctrine and argues for its continuity with Cold War strategies. Considers case for and performance in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Details first phase of the War on Terror and the traditional alliances that it relied on.