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In this chapter I return to the classics of bellicist theory to formalize their insights and derive concrete observational expectations for nineteenth-century Latin America. I first look at the work of Otto Hintze and Max Weber, who suggest a more holistic approach to the effects of war on the process of state formation which combines both pre-war and post-war phases in a single overarching theory. I then use the more modern concepts and logics of historical institutionalism to generate clearer predictions from their theories. I propose that, in a pre-war phase and when hostilities are taking place, mobilization will trigger taxation and repression—i.e., the extraction-coercion cycle. Yet, war outcomes will determine whether those contingent policies will become institutionalized after the critical juncture of war. While victory will consolidate a trajectory of state formation, defeat will render state institutions illegitimate and set losers into a path-dependent process of state weakening. Finally, I discuss actors and mechanisms specific to nineteenth-century Latin America and lay out the observational implications of my argument.
Political representation, based on the mandate bestowed on elected and responsible delegates, and applied at regional and national levels, can be considered as one of the major contributions of the western Middle Ages to world history. German historian Otto Hintze identified the conditions necessary for the unique emergence of representative government in western Europe. Hintze saw the extension of monarchical authority over the representative institutions for the development of representation. This chapter deals with the wider concept of representation, which includes forms. It is generally assumed that states or, before their stabilisation, countries or territories formed the system in which representative institutions operated. This chapter focuses on the analytical framework of political systems, starting from the various representative activities themselves, rather than from the territories. Royal elections stimulated the development of representative institutions in Sweden. Fundamental weaknesses of the medieval representative institutions were their lack of continuity in the monarchical model, and their lack of unity in both models.
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