This chapter departs from the classic definition of parties and applies a novel theory that casts doubt on the validity of the minimalist definition using two Costa Rican cases. Discussion of horizontal and vertical mechanisms as applied to the National Liberation Party (PLN) and Citizens Action Party (PAC) reveals strong similarities in terms of party organizations and challenges for policy consistency at the local level combined with marked contrasts in their capacities to process collective demands. The main finding of this chapter is that the PLN and PAC, two of the most prominent parties in the country, are quite different one from another. Regardless of their remarkable differences, both parties share the feature of having evolving constituencies, though their respective constituencies are evolving in opposite directions. The PLN fits the classic definition of a party with a well-organized and fully developed constituency suffering from decreasing membership over the last two decades. The PAC, on the other hand, does not have a sufficiently developed constituency to be considered a fully functioning party. The PAC does, however, have activists and is developing its membership.

I begin this chapter with a case study of Costa Rica, a country almost universally admired for its peaceful and democratic political system.In such a consolidated democracy, I demonstrate that political attention to rural voters played a crucial role in the electoral success of the dominant PLN party; however, when faced with fiscal crisis in the 1980s, inability to reform agricultural pricing policies (as well as wage policies for electorally-crucial public sector unions) ultimately drove Costa Rica into default.The chapter concludes with discussion of contentious democratic politics in Jamaica, where political violence often organized by parties in urban centers unfortunately often plays a role.In such a system, the importance of limiting urban unrest through cheap food policies became a clear target under both PNP and JLP rule.Under severe fiscal crisis in the 1980s, Jamaican rulers proved unwilling to reform pricing policies beneficial to urban interests out of fear of societal unrest that would result, driving Jamaica to default not only to its external creditors, but also on its loans from the IMF itself.