Chapter 4 begins with a look at the decline of the IDF’s once-unassailable reputation due to perceived failures on the battlefield. In the aftermath of the debacle of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the IDF underwent important changes, mirroring changes in Israeli society, which negatively impacted the generals’ role in shaping public opinion. The second Intifada, moreover, led the general public to conclude that Israel lacked a Palestinian negotiating partner – a widely accepted opinion that has been firmly entrenched in Israeli society in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. The “no partner” mantra has further diminished the generals’ clout given the security establishment’s association with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This chapter also addresses the implications of the national religious camp’s ascent and its increased influence in both the IDF and in the political arena.

Chapter 1 focuses on the Israeli security community’s desire to preserve Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, a sentiment that serves as the basis for the security veterans’ disproportionate support for the two-state solution. This chapter explores the assessments of the security establishment from the 1967 War to the Oslo peace process of the 1990s to the breakdown of the peace process in the 2000s. It shows that proposals for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were submitted by the IDF and intelligence services to the Eshkol government even before the conclusion of the 1967 “Six Day” War. Two decades later, the IDF top brass played an important role during the first Intifada in prodding the Rabin-led government to pursue peace talks with the PLO. During the second Intifada in the early 2000s, retired senior security establishment officials urged Prime Minister Sharon to resume peace diplomacy with the Palestinians. As this chapter shows, Israeli governments have varied in their commitment to pursuing a deal with the Palestinians based on the two-state solution, often putting them at odds with the national security community.

Chapter 3 focuses on the policy disagreements with the security community in the period following Netanyahu’s return to power in 2009, a decade after he lost his reelection to Barak. His dismissal of the two-state solution and aggressive settlement policy in the West Bank; his approach toward Hamas-led Gaza; and key aspects of his policy aimed at thwarting Iran’s nuclear program have encountered serious opposition by the security establishment and retired senior security officials. This chapter describes how civil-military tensions spiked following the formation of Netanyahu’s sixth government in December 2022 and its pursuit of its highly controversial legal overhaul.

Netanyahu’s worldview, his modus operandi, and the significant steps he has taken to keep the generals at bay are explored in Chapter 2. It is argued that he is a pragmatic hardliner – a lifelong right-wing ideologue and opponent of Palestinian statehood who nevertheless has displayed flexibility, enabling him to remain coy about his territorial vision for Israel. A master manipulator of the media, he has cultivated an image of himself as “Mr. Security” and sought, early on, to exclude the IDF generals from the decision-making process, associating them with the political left and seeing them as potential rivals. The security community, for its part, sees Netanyahu not as “Mr. Security” but, rather, as a politician who routinely places his personal and political interests ahead of national security concerns.

This chapter’s ethnography of the “quality of life” West Bank development/settlement of Alfei Menashe describes the structural realities and security schematic narrative lens through which this Jewish Israeli audience filtered “the conflict” and understood the series. They are viewed from outside by stateless-nation Palestinians as living behind the “Wall Enclave” and by state-minority Arab/Palestinian Israelis as a “settlement” (most Jewish Israelis regard it as a “consensus settlement”). Alfei provides its children the greatest opportunity for contact with Palestinians, which the separation barrier has all but eliminated for Israelis. Neither interpersonal contact with Palestinian day laborers who build and clean their homes and playgrounds, nor imagined contact influenced their readings of the text. From secondary conversations, news media portrayals, and artifacts like the barrier constructed to maintain the secured existence of Israel, they learn Palestinians are those who commit terror. Via a binary logic, anyone allowed into Israel (or Sesame Street) is not Palestinian. Fearing harm, a majority erased Palestinian characters. These processes, not Sesame Street, were overwhelmingly socializing them, leading them to oppose the series’ attempt to communicate peace. They normalized and reproduced “the conflict,” assuming defensive play patterns; for them, the resolution is “evicting, killing or imprisoning” Palestinians.

The litmus test for measuring the extent of democratization of any given society is the legal status of minorities and their enjoyment of equal civic and human rights. The less discriminatory the society is against minorities, the more democratic it is. In this respect, Israel is struggling. Egalitarianism in terms of safeguarding basic civic and human rights for all is still in the making. Israel has navigated between liberalism, on the one hand, and promoting its religion and nationality as a Jewish state, on the other. Throughout the years, Israeli leaders have given precedence to Judaism and Jewishness over liberalism. While sometimes their language uttered liberal values, Israeli leaders’ actions were perfectionist in essence, preferring one religion and one nation over others. While accommodations were sought and some compromises were made, the underlying motivation was not to achieve just egalitarianism. This chapter argues for accommodating the interests of the Israeli-Arabs/Palestinians, and that Israel should strive to safeguard equal rights and liberties for all citizens – notwithstanding religion, race, culture, ethnicity, colour, gender, class or sexual orientation.

This chapter provides a comprehensive description of the regime across dimensions and zones of control based on a short historical overview combined with several indexes reflecting different components of the regime. It shows that in Israel proper the highest levels of democraticness are in political contestation followed by protection, while the levels of coverage are much more limited. The regime in Israel proper is, overall, fairly stable despite some increase in democraticness after state consolidation and some more recent signs of possible decline. In the Occupied Territories, on the other hand, the levels of democraticness are minimal in the dimension of political contestation and coverage and highly limited in the area of protection. The regime in the Occupied Territories is not as stable as the regime in Israel proper due to changes in the zones of control. The zones of control shifted after the 1990s – a shift that can be seen as the major transformation of the Israeli regime up to date.

This chapter outlines a possible explanation for the overall stability of the Israeli regime based on the concept of state capacity, namely, the ability of the state to use coercive and administrative capabilities to “get things done.” It therefore emphasizes the role of the state itself in explaining the regime. The first section provides a short conceptual clarification of the concept of state capacity and its relationship with regime stability. This is followed by a presentation of the historical origins of Israeli state capacity and some measures of its capacity. The main part of this chapter discusses the ways in which state capacity sustains the regime’s stability in light of three challenges: the internal aspect of the conflict, the challenge to state authority from political tensions among its Jewish citizens, and the ways in which the zones of control have shifted according to the limited ability of state capacity to ensure direct control of the entire Occupied Territories.

Chapter 3 addresses the challenge of defining the borders of the unit of analysis. After a short historical overview of Israel’s borders, it discusses the justifications provided in previous analyses of Israel for the boundaries chosen to define the unit of analysis and their weaknesses. Additionally, it demonstrates that the problem of choosing these borders is not fully addressed even by the cross-national indexes, which detracts from their applicability in regime classification efforts. A conceptual elaboration on state and regime shows that the units of Israel proper or Israel/Palestine cannot be used to define the borders of the regime. Instead, a spatial analysis, which divides the Israeli regime into different zones of control at different time periods is required. The major shift that occurred in the regime of the Occupied Territories was the move from direct control over the entire territories between 1967 and 1994 to direct control of only Area C thereafter. The Israeli regime does not, therefore, include the Gaza Strip or Areas A/B. The main shift in the Israeli regime was a consequence of the First Intifada and the establishment of the Oslo process in the 1990s.

This chapter argues that Palestinians see humanitarianism and relief not as an act of charity but as a right and something that is owed to them by the international community because of their status.

U.S. Native American literature corresponds in the first instance with the anticolonial literatures of what used to be called the Third World. As such its periodization cannot be made to fit within the periodizations of U.S. American literature, either in terms of centuries or moments (modern/post-modern). More properly, one might begin to think of this literature, if one wants to periodize it at all, in terms of pre-and post-invasion. In this paper, I look at one instance of this correspondence of resistance in Acoma poet Simon Ortiz’s Fight Back: For the Sake of the Land/ For the Sake of the People and Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish’s Journal of an Ordinary Grief. I undertake this project both to reorient our thinking about the global place of U.S. Native American Literature and to think about the way this reorientation effects the hegemony of the current periodization of U.S. American literature.