The market failures approach (MFA) to business ethics argues that economic theory regarding the efficient workings of a market can generate normative prescriptions for managerial behaviour. It argues that actions that inhibit Pareto optimal solutions are immoral. However, the approach fails to identify goods that should be regulated or prohibited from the market, something common to the moral limits to markets (MLM) approach to business ethics. There are, however, numerous assumptions underlying Paretian efficiency, including some about the preferences of market participants. Trade in some goods violates some of these assumptions, and so these goods are morally suspect and can be understood to indicate that the market for these goods is not moral. This creates grounds sufficient for regulating, and possibly prohibiting, these goods. To help determine whether it is then necessary to regulate the goods, I propose a supplementary economic analysis to ascertain why an assumption regarding a particular preference is being violated.

This paper studies bilateral risk sharing under no aggregate uncertainty, where one agent has Expected-Utility preferences and the other agent has Rank-dependent utility preferences with a general probability distortion function. We impose exogenous constraints on the risk exposure for both agents, and we allow for any type or level of belief heterogeneity. We show that Pareto-optimal risk-sharing contracts can be obtained via a constrained utility maximization under a participation constraint of the other agent. This allows us to give an explicit characterization of optimal risk-sharing contracts. In particular, we show that an optimal risk-sharing contract contains allocations that are monotone functions of the likelihood ratio, where the latter is obtained from Lebesgue’s Decomposition Theorem.

This paper provides a convergent numerical approximation of the Pareto optimal set for finite-horizon multiobjective optimal control problems in which the objective space is not necessarily convex. Our approach is based on Viability Theory. We first introduce a set-valued return function V and show that the epigraph of V equals the viability kernel of a certain related augmented dynamical system. We then introduce an approximate set-valued return function with finite set-values as the solution of a multiobjective dynamic programming equation. The epigraph of this approximate set-valued return function equals to the finite discrete viability kernel resulting from the convergent numerical approximation of the viability kernel proposed in [P. Cardaliaguet, M. Quincampoix and P. Saint-Pierre. Birkhauser, Boston (1999) 177–247. P. Cardaliaguet, M. Quincampoix and P. Saint-Pierre, Set-Valued Analysis 8 (2000) 111–126]. As a result, the epigraph of the approximate set-valued return function converges to the epigraph of V. The approximate set-valued return function finally provides the proposed numerical approximation of the Pareto optimal set for every initial time and state. Several numerical examples illustrate our approach.

This paper modifies a Townsend turnpike model by letting agents stay at a location long enough to trade some consumption loans, but not long enough to support a Pareto-optimal allocation. Monetary equilibria exist that are nonoptimal in the absence of a scheme to pay interest on currency at a particular rate. Paying interest on currency at the optimal rate delivers a Pareto-optimal allocation, but a different one than the allocation for an associated nonmonetary centralized economy. The price level remains determinate under an optimal policy. We study the response of the model to “helicopter drops” of currency, steady increases in the money supply, and restrictions on private intermediation.

In this paper we consider a reinsurance syndicate, assuming that Pareto optimal allocations exist. Under a continuity assumption on preferences, we show that a competitive equilibrium exists and is unique. Our conditions allow for risks that are not bounded, and we show that the most standard models satisfy our set of sufficient conditions, which are thus not restrictive. Our approach is to transform the analysis from an infinite dimensional to a finite dimensional setting.

Pareto optimality is a domain-independent property that can be used to coordinate distributed engineering agents. Within a model of design called Redux, some aspects of dependency-directed backtracking can be interpreted as tracking Pareto optimality. These concepts are implemented in a framework, called Next-Link, that coordinates legacy engineering systems. This framework allows existing software tools to communicate with each other and a Redux agent over the Internet. The functionality is illustrated with examples from the domain of electrical cable harness design.

The concept of economic equilibrium under uncertainty is applied to a model of insurance market where, in distinction to the classic Borch’s model of a reinsurance market, risk exchanges are allowed between the insurer and each insured only, not among insureds themselves. Conditions characterizing an equilibrium are found. A variant of the conditions, based on the Pareto optimality notion and involving risk aversion functions of the agents, is derived. An existence theorem is proved. Computation of the market premiums and optimal indemnities is illustrated by an example with exponential utility functions.

In this paper, we consider the problem of Pareto optimal allocation in a general framework, involving preference functionals defined on a general real vector space. The optimization problem is equivalent to a modified sup-convolution of the different agents’ preference functionals. The results are then applied to a multi-period setting and some further characterization of Pareto optimality for an allocation is obtained for expected utility for processes.

In distinction to the Borch’s model of a reinsurance market, this paper treats the problem of optimal risk exchange in an insurance market where treaties are allowed between the insurer and each insured only, not among insureds themselves. A characterization of the Pareto-optimal contract is found. It is shown that the indemnity function in the contract is of a coinsurance kind. We also present a way of finding Pareto-optimal contracts under individual rationality constraints. The obtained results are compared with those of the known model of risk exchange in a reinsurance market.

The paper analyses the questions: Should – or should not – an individual buy insurance? And if so, what insurance coverage should he or she prefer? Unlike classical studies of optimal insurance coverage, this paper analyses these questions from a bonus-malus point of view, that is, for insurance contracts with individual bonus-malus (experience rating or no-claim) adjustments. The paper outlines a set of new statements for bonus-malus contracts and compares them with corresponding classical statements for standard insurance contracts. The theoretical framework is an expected utility model, and both optimal coverage for a fixed premium function and Pareto optimal coverage are analyzed. The paper is an extension of another paper by the author, see Holtan (2001), where the necessary insight to – and concepts of – bonus-malus contracts are outlined.

This paper attempts to give an overview of the pricing of risks in a pure exchange economy, where trade takes place at time zero and where uncertainty is revealed at time one. An economic equilibrium model under uncertainty is formulated, where conditions characterizing a Pareto optimal exchange equilibrium are derived. We present two sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, and demonstrate how equilibria can be characterized through several examples. Uniqueness of equilibrium is also discussed. Special attention is given to the principal components that the premiums in a reinsurance market must depend upon. We also apply the general theory to the risk exchange problem between a policyholder and an insurer, and in particular we compute market premiums of the resulting optimal contracts.

It is emphasized throughout how the formulation of a competitive equilibrium, rather than merely a general risk exchange formulation, is of particular interest in deriving a well-defined and unique set of equilibrium premiums in an insurance market. The theory is put into a framework which is fruitful for extensions beyond the one-period case.

We explicitly calculate price equilibria for power and logarithmic utility functions which—together with the exponential utility functions—form the so-called HARA (Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion) class.

A price equilibrium is economically admissible in the market which is a closed system. Furthermore it is on the one side individually optimal for each participant of the market (in the sense of maximal expected utility), on the other side it is a Pareto optimum and thus collectively optimal for the market as a whole.