Chapter 6 takes stock of several insights that follow from the previous five chapters. One set of insights concerns expectations of a left-wing turn. Such expectations overlook the filtering role of fairness beliefs and fail to account for the redistribution to facet of redistributive preferences. Once these blind spots are accounted for, there are few reasons to expect a systematic relationship between an increase in income inequality and demand for redistribution. Another set of insights speaks to mass attitudinal change: The argument presented in the previous chapters points to factors that have received limited attention in political economy, including fiscal stress, survey design, and long-term partisan dynamics. One factor, immigration-induced ethnic diversity, is conspicuous by its absence. Part of the disconnect between inequality and support for redistribution could be due to hostility to immigrants. This chapter concludes by proposing several amendments to this line of reasoning, which, jointly, explain why, in this book, immigration-induced diversity ultimately takes a back seat.

Chapter 8 traces the unexpected empirical patterns described in Chapter 1 to belief change and framing effects, themselves triggered by changes in how elites compete over redistributive issues. In line with the argument presented in Part 1, it also shows that belief change plays out differently depending on (1) which type of fairness beliefs is affected by partisan dynamics (proportionality or reciprocity) and (2) people’s position as net beneficiaries (or net contributors) of redistribution to policies, as proxied by their income level. In Great Britain, in particular, I find that framing effects tied to survey design further explain how belief change affects answers to the traditional redistribution question. In the United States, the decline in the size of the income gradient follows from the politicization of redistribution to policies (and reciprocity concerns) over redistribution from policies (and proportionality concerns). Against common expectations, the decline in the income gradient originates in growing support for redistribution among rich Democrats, not declining support among poor (often white) Republicans.