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Siegfried Sassoon and Edmund Blunden both saw action and survived into the late twentieth century as successful men of letters whose styles were quite different. This chapter looks at their literary friendship and compares their work, clarifying where they stand in relation to the Georgians and other war poets, while putting them in a broader cultural perspective. It shows how experience of the trenches led them to twist traditional forms, and examines the stylistic and personal challenges they faced as survivors, their writings ever more retrospective. It argues that Blunden’s complexpoetry may feel archaic but has Modernist elements and has been unjustly neglected by comparison with Sassoon’s more accessible but less subtle verse. With close analysis and comparison, and some redefining of key texts, the chapter emphasises their contrasting approaches: Blunden the troubled pastoralist, exploring profounder shades of meaning; Sassoon deliberately ‘anti-poetic’, but with satirical designs on us.
The colonial talks of mid-1917 were the turning point of inter-Allied war diplomacy: they cleared standing contrasts and accepted most of Italian imperialist aspirations. For Rome it proved a Pyrrhic victory.
The entry of the United States doomed the Central Powers in the long run but not during 1917, as the collapse of Russia deprived the Allies of their largest army at a time when the Americans could not yet make good the loss. Unable to afford a repeat of the bloody battles of 1916, the Germans resolved to stand on the defensive in the west while the U-boats (and the Bolsheviks) did their work. Meanwhile, the failure of Nivelle’s spring offensive nearly broke the French army, leaving it paralyzed by mutiny for much of the rest of the year, while British and Imperial troops attacked at Arras and Vimy Ridge in the spring, then at Passchendaele in the summer and autumn, gaining little ground at great cost. A November attack at Cambrai, ultimately indecisive, showed how tanks could be used effectively. On other fronts, Russia’s attempt to use Czech deserters against Austria-Hungary was more successful than Germany’s efforts to use Polish deserters against Russia, but not decisively so. The Allies added Greece to their ranks by overthrowing its pro-German king, but nearly lost Italy after the Central Powers achieved a decisive victory at Caporetto, and lost Romania when Russia sued for peace.
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