We study a discrete-time life cycle retirement planning problem for individual workers with four distinct investment options: self-management with dynamic investment (S), self-management with benchmark investment (B), hire-management with flexible allocation ($\text{H}_{1}$), and hire-management with alpha focus ($\text{H}_{2}$). We examine the investment strategies and consumption patterns during the defined contribution fund accumulation period, ending with a life annuity purchase at retirement to finance post-retirement consumption. Based on the calibrated model using US data, we employ numerical dynamic programming technique to optimize worker’s financial decisions. Our analysis reveals that, despite the agency risk, delegated investments can add value to a worker’s lifetime utility, with the $\text{H}_2$ option yielding the best lifetime utility outcome. However, after taking the fund management fee into consideration, we find that both the $\text{H}_1$ and $\text{H}_2$ options may not offer additional value compared to the S option, yet they still surpass the B option in performance.

This paper obtains an optimal strategy in a finite horizon time for a portfolio of a defined contribution (DC) pension fund for an investor with the CRRA utility function. It employs the optimal stochastic control method in a financial market with two different asset markets, one risk-free and another one risky asset in which its jump follows either by a finite or infinite activity Lévy process. Sensitivity of jump parameters in an uncertainty financial market has been studied.

When the financial positions of pension funds worsen, regulations prescribe that pension funds reduce the gap between their assets (invested contributions) and their liabilities (accumulated pension promises). This paper quantifies the business cycle effects and distributional implications of various types of restoration policies. We extend a canonical New-Keynesian model with a tractable demographic structure and, as a novelty, a flexible pension fund framework. Fund participants accumulate inflation-indexed or non-indexed benefits and funding adequacy is restored by revaluing previously accumulated pension wealth (Defined Contribution (DC)) or changing the pension fund contribution rate on labor income (Defined Benefit (DB)). Economies with DC pension funds respond similarly to adverse capital quality shocks as economies without pension funds. DB pension funds, however, distort labor supply decisions and exacerbate economic fluctuations. While DB pension funds achieve intergenerational risk-sharing, welfare analyses indicate that the negative effects of the induced distortions are sizeable.

This paper studies the effects of risk aversion and density of contribution (DoC) on comparisons of proportional charges on flow (contributions) and balance (assets) during the accumulation phase of a defined-contribution pension plan in a system of individual retirement accounts. If the participant's degree of risk aversion increases and both charges yield the same expected terminal wealth, then the charge on balance improves with respect to the charge on flow when performing comparisons that examine the ratio between the resulting expected utilities of terminal wealth. When this methodology is applied to the Peruvian Private Pension System, empirical results demonstrate that the aforementioned result also holds for arbitrary charges on flow and balance and that the effect of DoC on these comparisons is nearly negligible for most of the assessed scenarios.

This paper explores the application of ERM-style techniques to pension funds. It uses the term ‘entity-wide risk management’ rather than ‘enterprise risk management’, even though both have the same acronym (‘ERM’), because many pension funds do not view themselves as business ‘enterprises’ as such. Some of the techniques that business enterprises have for managing risk (e.g. raising new capital from shareholders or branching into new business areas if existing ones have unattractive risk-reward characteristics) may not be open to many pension funds. The paper argues that the holistic approach to risk management (and governance) that is a hallmark of ERM is as appropriate to pension funds as it is to any other type of entity. This is the case whether the fund is defined benefit or defined contribution in nature, or a hybrid. It is also the case whether the ‘entity’ is deemed to be the fund itself, the sponsor or the two combined. Indeed, there are aspects of pension arrangements, such as the relationship between the fund and its sponsor, that lend added impetus to the use of ERM-style techniques in practical pension fund management.

This paper looks at the risks faced by financial institutions, and how they can be modelled and managed. I compare the way in which each of the risks affects different types of financial institution and look for similarities (and differences) across industries. Finally, I consider what makes a good risk management system.

The asset allocation is a crucial decision for pension funds, and this paper analyses the economic factors which determine this choice. The analysis proceeds on the basis that, in the absence of taxation, risk sharing and default insurance, the asset allocation between equities and bonds is indeterminate and governed by the risk/return preferences of the trustees and the employer. If the employing company and its shareholders are subject to taxation, there is a tax advantage in a largely bond allocation. Risk sharing between the employer and the employees often means that one group favours a high equity allocation, while the other favours a low equity allocation. Underpriced default insurance creates an incentive for a high equity allocation. When taxation, risk sharing and underpriced default insurance are all present, it is concluded that the appropriate asset allocation varies with the circumstances of the scheme; but that a high equity allocation is probably inappropriate for many private sector pension schemes.