The ability to extract form information from a visual scene, for object recognition or figure–ground segregation, is a fundamental visual system function. Many studies of nonhuman primates have addressed the neural mechanisms involved in global form processing, but few have sought to demonstrate this ability behaviorally. In this study, we probed global visual processing in macaque monkeys (Macaca nemestrina) using classical Kanizsa illusory shapes as an assay of global form perception. We trained three monkeys on a “similarity match-to-sample” form discrimination task, first with complete forms embedded in fields of noncontour-inducing “pacman” elements. We then tested them with classic Kanizsa illusory shapes embedded in fields of randomly oriented elements. Two of the three subjects reached our criterion performance level of 80% correct or better on four of five illusory test conditions, demonstrating clear evidence of Kanizsa illusory form perception; the third subject mastered three of five conditions. Performance limits for illusory form discrimination were obtained by manipulating support ratio and by measuring threshold for discriminating “fat” and “thin” illusory squares. Our results indicate that macaque monkeys are capable of global form processing similarly to humans and that the perceptual mechanisms for “filling-in” contour gaps exist in macaques as they do in humans.

In visual science the term filling-in is used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to theoretical issues about neural–perceptual isomorphism and linking propositions. Six main conclusions are drawn: (1) visual filling-in comprises a multitude of different perceptual completion phenomena; (2) certain forms of visual completion seem to involve spatially propagating neural activity (neural filling-in) and so, contrary to Dennett's (1991; 1992) recent discussion of filling-in, cannot be described as results of the brain's “ignoring an absence” or “jumping to a conclusion”; (3) in certain cases perceptual completion seems to have measurable effects that depend on neural signals representing a presence rather than ignoring an absence; (4) neural filling-in does not imply either “analytic isomorphism” or “Cartesian materialism,” and thus the notion of the bridge locus – a particular neural stage that forms the immediate substrate of perceptual experience – is problematic and should be abandoned; (5) to reject the representational conception of vision in favor of an “enactive” or “animate” conception reduces the importance of filling-in as a theoretical category in the explanation of vision; and (6) the evaluation of perceptual content should not be determined by “subpersonal” considerations about internal processing, but rather by considerations about the task of vision at the level of the animal or person interacting with the world.