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This chapter examines the fidelity discourse as applied to Greek drama and how it has affected the ways in which adaptations have tended to be detrimentally regarded. The chapter challenges the premise that we have access to the original versions of these plays, and suggests ways in which we can approach adaptation as a positive act of creativity that has enabled the work to survive, rather than a kind of debasement of the canon. The chapter also shows how the fidelity discourse exerts a negative influence on the adaptation of Greek drama, by using examples drawn from the author's own work on adaptations with the Aquila Theatre public programming aimed at the veteran community in the United States. By briefly describing these performance projects, the chapter hopes to show how an informed approach to adaptation can produce new ways in which to increase engagement with and knowledge of ancient dramatic works.
explores the phenomenon of disintegration, akrasia, in which the agent’s better judgment and appetite (classified as a feeling by Aristotle) come apart and the agent acts voluntarily simply on her appetite instead of her better judgment. Here again I rely on my account of indexical insight from , and I return to Sophocles’ Philoctetes to give a reading of the play that supports Aristotle’s claim that Neoptolemus is not akratic when he ceases to fall in with Odysseus’s plan to deceive Philoctetes, because he is not acting incorrectly. The upshot of my discussion, a detailed interpretation of the infamous EN VII 3, is that the akratic lacks the self-knowledge, the thoughtfulness, and virtue of character to act reliably in a correct manner. Contrary to the contention of modern philosophers, I argue that akrasia is primarily an ethical phenomenon.
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