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Materiality, Technology, and Constructing Social Knowledge through Bodily Representation: A View from Prehistoric Guernsey, Channel Islands
Sheila Kohring
Journal:

European Journal of Archaeology / Volume 17 / Issue 2 / 2014

Published online by Cambridge University Press:

25 January 2017, pp. 248-263

Print publication:

2014
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The role of the human body in the creation of social knowledge—as an ontological and/or aesthetic category—has been applied across social theory. In all these approaches, the body is viewed as a locus for experience and knowledge. If the body is a source of subjective knowledge, then it can also become an important means of creating ontological categories of self and society. The materiality of human representations within art traditions, then, can be interpreted as providing a means for contextualizing and aestheticizing the body in order to produce a symbolic and structural knowledge category. This paper explores the effect of material choices and techniques of production when representing the human body on how societies order and categorize the world.

9 - Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief
- By Mark Richard
Edited by Alan Berger, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
Book:

Saul Kripke

Published online:

05 June 2012

Print publication:

06 June 2011, pp 211-234
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Summary

Pierre's experience in England warrants our saying that he believes that London is not pretty. This leads to a puzzle does Pierre, or does he not believe that London is pretty. This chapter explores a question that why should one care about Pierre. Saul Kripke suggests that the way the puzzle about Pierre arises casts doubt on a standard argument against "Millianism", the view that the semantic role of a proper name is exhausted by its being a name of whatever it names. If one thinks of a way of thinking as something to be identified with, or at least individuated in terms of, a collection of objects, properties, and relations, the puzzles Kripke presents us with are indeed difficult to solve. Kripke's puzzle is a puzzle about belief. Linguistic interpretation is not exactly Millian, but it is, or at least is usually, pretty close.

10 - A Note on Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief
- By Nathan Salmon
Edited by Alan Berger, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
Book:

Saul Kripke

Published online:

05 June 2012

Print publication:

06 June 2011, pp 235-252
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Millianism is the belief that the semantic content of a proper name is just the name's designatum. Millianism has it that Pierre has the contradictory beliefs that London is pretty and that London is not pretty Kripke uses his well-known puzzle about belief as a defense of Millianism against the standard objection from apparent failure of substitution. This chapter argues relatively hard results in connection with Saul Kripke's well-known puzzle about belief, and for resulting constraints on a correct solution. A complete solution must acknowledge that Pierre has contradictory beliefs. In presenting the puzzle, Kripke follows a sound methodology championed in Alfred Tarski's classic discussion of the liar paradox. Unlike Tarski, Kripke does not make any official pronouncement concerning which principles are guilty. Instead he considers a variety of possible answers to the puzzle without officially endorsing any of them.