Logical pluralism is sometimes motivated by the claim that it affords a more charitable interpretation of important debates in philosophical logic than monism does. This chapter argues that this claim is false. Pluralists are unable to account for important parts of logical and mathematical practice since they are in no position to account for potential rivalry between different logics. This is a problem for the charity-based project because most non-classical logicians formulate their theories of logical consequence as rivals to classical logic. I introduce three approaches to rivalry that focus on semantics, metasemantics, and applications, respectively. I argue in this chapter that neither the semantic nor the metasemantic approach offer a sense of rivalry that is plausible from a pluralist perspective, leaving the applicational approach for the following chapter. I further argue that this supports the conclusion that, at least as far as issues concerning the meanings of logical vocabulary are concerned, the correct logics are ultimately compatible. If we are interested in potential rivalry between the logics, we will have to look elsewhere.