Theoretical expectations regarding communication patterns between legislators and outside agents, such as lobbyists, agency officials, or policy experts, often depend on the relationship between legislators’ and agents’ preferences. However, legislators and nonelected outside agents evaluate the merits of policies using distinct criteria and considerations. We develop a measurement method that flexibly estimates the policy preferences for a class of outside agents—witnesses in committee hearings—separate from that of legislators’ and compute their preference distance across the two dimensions. In our application to Medicare hearings, we find that legislators in the U.S. Congress heavily condition their questioning of witnesses on preference distance, showing that legislators tend to seek policy information from like-minded experts in committee hearings. We do not find this result using a conventional measurement placing both actors on one dimension. The contrast in results lends support for the construct validity of our proposed preference measures.

Black women have come to be seen as a dominant force in American politics—particularly in support of the Democratic party. However, this dominance in the political sphere has not translated to dominance in the economic sphere. Despite Black women’s outperformance of their Black male peers in higher education outcomes and overrepresentation in the labor force, there is still an economic gap between Black women and their male counterparts. In addition, regional differences in cost of living have led to diverging local conditions for Black women as well. What do Black women’s socioeconomic outcomes mean for their political ideology and political preferences? Few studies capture intra-group variation among Black women and how the context in which they live may shape their economic and sociopolitical outlook. Using the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey, we examine how the relationship between Black women’s socioeconomic status and their political beliefs and the relationship between Black women’s socioeconomic status and political preferences are conditioned by region. We capture the individual factors and regional context that shape differences among Black women in their political beliefs and policy attitudes. This research furthers our understanding of differences in Black women’s politics.

The US has experienced runaway economic inequality since the 1970s, yet there is no strong public support for government efforts that serve to narrow the growing disparities between citizens. Why? I point to the role of rising racial diversity. I argue Americans believe in conditional equality, where they support equalizing policies as long as they perceive the beneficiaries as people like themselves. However, as the country grows more diverse, citizens are less likely to perceive those around them as people like themselves. Using time-series cross-sectional data of the American states, I demonstrate that as racial diversity increases, the likelihood the public will respond to increasing inequality by supporting bigger government declines. This study provides evidence for the mechanism usually implied but rarely tested by studies of diversity and policy: mass preferences.

Does providing information about the costs and benefits of automation affect the perceived fairness of a firm's decision to automate or support for government policies addressing automation's labor market consequences? To answer these questions, we use data from vignette and conjoint experiments across four advanced economies (Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US). Our results show that despite people's relatively fixed policy preferences, their evaluation of the fairness of automation—and therefore potentially the issue's political salience—is sensitive to information about its trade-offs, especially information about price changes attributable to automated labor. This suggests that the political impact of automation may depend on how it is framed by the media and political actors.

Why do citizens support or reject climate change mitigation policies? This is not an easy choice: citizens need to support the government in making these decisions, accept potentially radical behavior change, and have altruism across borders and for future generations. A substantial literature argues that political trust facilitates citizen support for these complex policy decisions by mitigating the cost and uncertainty that policies impose on individuals and buttressing support for government intervention. We test whether this is the case with a pre-registered conjoint experiment fielded in Germany in which we vary fundamental aspects of policy design that are related to the cost, uncertainty, and implementation of climate change policies. Contrary to strong theoretical expectations and previous work, we find no difference between those with low and high trust on their support for different policy attributes, assuaging the concern that low and declining trust inhibits climate policymaking.

Hard cider is a sector of a maturing craft beverage industry that continues to experience growth in the United States. Cider is also experiencing challenges, however, such as competition from other alcohol markets, changing consumer preferences, the supply chain, and inflationary pressures. National policy changes may help promote more optimal outcomes for this sector, but public support is important to policy formation. This study uses survey data from a best-worst scaling experiment of consumers in four leading cider-producing states (Michigan, Washington, Wisconsin, and Vermont) to understand preferences toward ten broad cider policy initiatives. The results of multinomial logistic modeling reveal that consumers prefer policies mandating ingredients, nutrition facts, and allergen labeling across all ciders. The least preferred policy initiatives include allowing producers to use vintage on labeling and funding regional cider development. These results have important implications for stakeholders across the industry, including the benefits of labeling disclosures in marketing and the need to improve public awareness of barriers to cider industry development.

Does the threat of automation of workers’ employment provoke distinct policy preferences from that of globalization? We present hypotheses about how these different threats affect support for policies to prevent such shocks as well as policies to compensate via redistribution. Using vignettes and conjoint experiments embedded in survey evidence from Spain, we find that the threat of automation does not provoke any greater demand for redistribution than does openness. Nor does job loss due to automation provoke beliefs of greater deservingness of compensatory transfers, compared to job loss from openness. While the threat of offshoring and hiring foreign workers increases support for policies to prevent this process from occurring, scenarios of robot substitution do not provoke a similar reaction. These results suggest policies to prioritize automation over openness may gain less political traction.

Climate change mitigation depends on tracking public opinion across populations. Social scientists can collaborate with environmental organizations that conduct surveys among their audiences. We teamed up with the non-profit Milieudefensie, who surveyed Dutch attitudes towards climate change in 2019–2020. The large dataset had face-to-face (n = 3,102) and online interviews (n = 30,311) of urbanity, climate concern, policy preferences, interviewer-rated engagement with climate change, and behavior (whether the interviewee provided their email and phone number to the organization). To reveal the representativeness of these kinds of convenience samples, we tested whether attitudes and their associations with behaviors were similar to previous studies. Climate concern, preference for climate policy, and interviewer-rated engagement were high. In the online survey, 47% of respondents signed up for an email newsletter, and 7% provided their phone number. Higher climate concern and preference for climate policy predicted interviewer-rated engagement and behavior (weak to strong associations). Urbanity was not related to concern, policy preferences, or interviewer-rated engagement. Policy preferences did not differ between the face-to-face and online samples. The results provide convergent evidence to conventional online surveys. These Dutch residents appear slightly more engaged with systemic change to mitigate climate change than the general public.

Political trust matters for citizens’ policy preferences but existing research has not fully understood how this effect depends on policy design. To advance this research area, we theorise that policy controls that limit or condition policy provision can function as safeguards against uncertainty, thereby compensating for a person’s lack of trust in generating support. Focusing on public preferences for asylum and refugee policy, we conduct an original conjoint experiment in eight European countries. We find that individuals with lower levels of trust in European political institutions are less supportive of policies providing unlimited or unconditional protection and more supportive of restrictive policies. We also show that policy design features such as limits and conditions can mitigate perceived uncertainty for individuals who are less trusting in European political institutions. These findings have important implications for the theoretical understanding of how political trust pertains to citizens’ preferences.

Why do business leaders support or oppose interstate wars? This article clarifies and empirically illustrates two competing perspectives on the sources of business war preferences: the opinions businesses have about interstate conflict. Namely, while an “economic consequences” perspective argues that business war preferences stem primarily from the economic effects of interstate conflicts, a “leader ideology” perspective predicts that business leaders’ domestic policy preferences and political ideology will determine their war preferences. I reexamine historical survey data on American business leaders’ opinions about the Vietnam War using item response theory scaling and regression analysis and find support for both perspectives. These results point toward the importance of further theoretical and empirical research on the sources of business war preferences, so I propose a structured, forward-looking research agenda on business war preferences based on different conceptualizations of businesses, their motivations, and the consequences of interstate conflicts.

A core part of political research is to identify how political preferences are shaped. The nature of these questions is such that robust causal identification is often difficult to achieve, and we are not seldom stuck with observational methods that we know have limited causal validity. The purpose of this paper is to measure the magnitude of bias stemming from both measurable and unmeasurable confounders across three broad domains of individual determinants of political preferences: socio-economic factors, moral values, and psychological constructs. We leverage a unique combination of rich Swedish registry data for a large sample of identical twins, with a comprehensive battery of 34 political preference measures, and build a meta-analytical model comparing our most conservative observational (naive) estimates with discordant twin estimates. This allows us to infer the amount of bias from unobserved genetic and shared environmental factors that remains in the naive models for our predictors, while avoiding precision issues common in family-based designs. The results are sobering: in most cases, substantial bias remains in naive models. A rough heuristic is that about half of the effect size even in conservative observational estimates is composed of confounding.

Political economy theories tell us that policy preferences are driven by economic self-interest and that party cues can be a rational decision-making strategy. But does citizens’ ability to assess their self-interest influence the sources of information they rely on and their policy choices? I hypothesise that financial and economic literacy influences the type of information individuals are responsive to, and ultimately, their economic policy preferences. Using a survey experiment on price controls in Italy, I manipulate whether citizens receive party cues or policy information. I show that financially and economically literate individuals are more likely to understand information concerning the costs and benefits of the policy under analysis, and to be responsive to it. This is not the case for financially and economically illiterate individuals, who are more receptive to party cues, even when such cues are misleading and lead them to support welfare-reducing policies.

How does unemployment risk affect workers’ support for demanding active labour market policies (ALMPs)? There may be a substantial number of workers who experience unemployment risk from labour market disruptions. Yet, we know less about its impact on demanding ALMP support than the impact of unemployment status. Here, I explore the impact of unemployment risk through automation. Automation-threatened workers’ support for demanding ALMPs may be influenced by two opposing considerations that are linked to their potential reliance on welfare. First, they may worry about barriers to welfare access. Second, they may worry about welfare competition, especially under austerity. Their support for demanding ALMPs would hence depend on which consideration they find to be most salient. Based on the European Social Survey (2016) data on West European countries, I find that automation-threatened workers significantly support such policies. This may indicate that they find welfare competition concerns more salient than welfare access ones.

Can crime victimization increase support for iron-fist crime-reduction policies? It is difficult to assess the political effects of crime, mainly because of the presence of unmeasured confounders. This study uses panel data from Brazil and strategies for reducing sensitivity to hidden biases to study how crime victims update their policy preferences. It also examines survey data from eighteen Latin American countries to improve the external validity of the findings. The results show that crime victims are more likely to support iron-fist or strong-arm measures to reduce crime, such as allowing state repression. Affected citizens are also found to value democracy less, which might explain their willingness to accept the erosion of basic rights in favor of radical measures to combat delinquency. These findings reveal that exposure to crime can change what people think the state should be allowed to do, which can have important political implications.

Despite increasing support for conservation efforts, humans exert strong negative forces on nature and disagree over the management of these effects. Conflicts over conservation policy may reflect evolving opinions about how people ought to conserve species and whether to intervene in various processes. To understand public preferences for conservation in the USA, we measured support for various strategies in five case studies, where we pitted one species against another in simplified but realistic scenarios. Among our online convenience sample of 1040 participants, we found the majority of participants favoured habitat protection in all but one case, and there was little acceptance of lethal control across all cases. The results reveal that habitat protection preferences positively relate to considerations of moral principles and ecosystems and negatively relate to economic and practical considerations. Older, conservative and male participants were less likely to support habitat protection and more likely to support no action. The results suggest broad support for holistic nature conservation that benefits both people and nature and highlight areas where current wildlife management may not align with public preferences. Controversy may continue until wildlife management policies are consistent with societal values and address moral and ecosystem considerations at multiple levels.

The literature has proposed two potential channels through which monetary policy played a role in the Great Inflation in the United States. One approach posits that the Federal Reserve held misperceptions of the economy. An alternative explanation contends that policy makers shifted preferences from an output gap stabilization goal toward inflation stabilization after 1979. This paper develops a medium-scale macroeconomic model that incorporates real-time learning by policy makers as well as a (potential) shift in policy makers' preferences. The empirical results show that combining both views—distorted policy makers' beliefs about the persistence of inflation and the inflation-output gap trade-off, accompanied by a stronger preference for inflation stabilization after 1979—illuminates the role played by monetary policy in propagating and ending the Great Inflation.