Chapter 6 propose the CoE pursues a more proactive, judicious, rapprochement with areas of conflict in Europe in line with the object and purpose of the organisation. This rapprochement requires political will, but can be substantially shaped by and based on the vision and associated initiatives of the Secretary General. It seeks to reflect on several legal, political or operational activities might contribute to satisfying the ordre public imperative described in Chapter 3. The objective is to begin to identify practical initiatives which could be pursued in accordance with the Statute to enable progress in a fully impartial, standards-based manner.

On paper, eliminating cervical cancer looks doable. Given the effectiveness of the three pillars of prevention: primary, secondary, and tertiary, virtually no person with a cervix should die of the disease. HPV vaccination provides near-perfect protection, and for those who missed the vaccine’s age cut-off or who live in countries that can’t afford to provide it, cervical screening and follow-up resolve 90 percent of early cervical pre-cancer. Cancer can even be cured via treatment if it’s found early enough. And yet, despite the reliability of these prevention pillars, myriad obstacles stand in the way of providing consistent, well-attended programs – including widespread misunderstandings and misgivings about the HPV vaccine, a universal aversion to pelvic exams, and cultural restrictions against exposing women’s bodies to strangers. These underlying issues have long undermined efforts to eradicate the disease and diminished political will toward investing in this cause, particularly in countries or regions with meager health care budgets. Until these obstacles are addressed, simply throwing money at the problem will never be enough.

Chapter 2 considers and critiques a number of rationalist explanations for these developments, including geopolitics, financial necessity, administrative capacity, principal-agent problems, and potential collective action issues. It argues, first, that some combination of these factors is largely capable of explaining the Qing’s approach to nonagricultural taxation, which grew whenever the state faced significant fiscal pressure, but was subject to a number of political economy and administrative constraints that became increasingly apparent in the nineteenth century. The chapter then argues that these rationalist theories are unable to fully explain the stagnation of agricultural taxes from the early eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, which suggests that ideological factors should be brought in to complete the picture.

The solution to global warming, air pollution, and energy security requires not only a technical and economic roadmap but also popular support, political will, and a rapid rollout of the solution. In fact, the main barriers to transitioning to 100 percent clean, renewable energy are neither technical nor economic; instead, they are social and political. People need to be confident that a solution is possible, to understand what changes they can make in their own lives to solve the problems, to make such changes, and to support policymakers who pass laws speeding a transition. Policymakers themselves need to understand the urgency, and thus take bold steps. One of the most important factors leading to a change is education about what is needed and how fast it is needed. This chapter discusses the necessary timeline for a transition, obstacles in the way of meeting the timeline, actions that individuals can take, and policies that are needed to overcome the obstacles to meet the 100 percent goal on time.

This chapter offers the story of the green movement since the 1950s as a case study in how to bring about deep and lasting societal change in the absence of full political consensus. Over the past 60 years, green activists have not succeeded in fully realizing their goal of a sustainable economic system, but they have succeeded in bringing pervasive changes to modern economic, social, and energy systems. By pursuing an eclectic, decentralized, and multifaceted set of strategies over many decades, they have made a significant positive impact. A similar strategy is likely to work best for building new systems of global governance for mega-dangerous technologies. Climate change may prove to be a uniquely potent unifying factor for humankind over the coming decades, allowing effective mobilization for incremental reforms. The reasons for this are threefold: climate change is not subject to the logic of arms races; it threatens to bring tangible harms that affect all human beings; and its disasters will escalate gradually over the coming decades, giving people a chance to wake up and respond constructively.

Chapter 7 probes deeper into policy and advocacy approaches, drawing out the strategies and techniques utilised by UNICEF Rwanda when seeking to enhance Rwanda’s implementation of, and compliance with, international standards. Drawing on themes that emerged from the empirical data, the strategies and techniques can broadly be categorised as capacity building; sensitising the community; using the existing domestic legal framework; the use of legal and non-legal discourse; capitalising on political will and developing relationships; and offering incentives but making compromises. Drawing on international law, international relations and anthropology to theorise the empirical findings, the chapter argues that UNICEF Rwanda was very flexible and pragmatic in its approach, adopting a range of strategies and techniques that were considered necessary and appropriate in the given context, and which can broadly be categorised as collaborative and constructive rather than coercive.

Rwanda has become the paradigmatic case for a missed opportunity to prevent genocide and human suffering on the largest scale, and subsequent analyses of this case have shaped a significant part of the practical and academic thinking. The chapter contests the dominant argument that Rwanda was a straightforward case for heeding plenty, early and high-quality warnings. It argues that indications need to be distinguished from actual warnings and persuasiveness of warnings needs to be empirically studied rather than assumed. The analysis shows that most sources cited in the literature did not contain an actual warning and gave a more ambiguous picture than is claimed by proponents who argue that lack of political will, not warnings, was the problem. It is suggested that hindsight bias partly explains why the availability of warnings has been overestimated, whereas the diagnostic difficulties in this case were underestimated. Contrary to expectations, persuasive warning communication appears to be no less of a problem for preventive policy as the will and ability to respond. The findings suggest that renewed attention is needed to the challenge of making knowledge, relevance and action claims about impending mass atrocities that are clear and persuasive enough.