Chapter 3 revisits the history of the 1974–5 Nhari mutiny in ZANLA. The chapter highlights the consequence of conflicting understandings of loyalty in the mutiny and it argues that the revolt was driven by internal grievances and not by the colonial Rhodesian state, as argued by some scholars. The grievances did not originate from ZANLA camps but in the war zone. Focusing on the warfront provides an important corrective to the exile literature’s emphasis on the space of the camp, which mistakenly gives a lower profile to the influence of war-zone dynamics in upheavals experienced by liberation movements. By exploring Mujuru’s political training in China, the chapter contributes to the inadequate literature on African liberation fighters’ experiences in Communist states. The chapter argues that Mujuru had a practical and instrumental understanding of his training in supportive Communist countries. Mujuru’s particular understanding of relations with Communist states shows that communist ideals were not uncomplicatedly transmitted to African apprentices because they brought their own set of powerful preferences. Finally, the chapter examines the divisive politics surrounding the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, leader of ZANU’s War Council in 1975, and it explains – for the first time – Mujuru’s daring escape from Zambia to Tanzania.

This chapter focuses on Mujuru’s contribution to the creation of ZIPA, which was a union of ZANLA and ZIPRA. It describes Mujuru’s role in securing a new primary host (Mozambique’s FRELIMO government), from where ZIPA launched guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia. The chapter deepens the book’s exploration of the intricate relations between host governments and liberation movements and contributes to the limited scholarship on the workings of transnational political partnerships, through its examination of the relationship between the FRELIMO government, Tanzania (subsidiary host) and ZIPA. The chapter also explains why ZIPA eventually collapsed. Many scholars have debated, in inconclusive terms, Robert Mugabe’s 1977 rise to power in Mozambique. The chapter argues Mujuru played a pivotal part in convincing FRELIMO leader Samora Machel to back Mugabe’s leadership bid. Mujuru played the role of kingmaker in Mugabe’s rise to the helm of ZANU PF because of his respect for party and military hierarchy and for the secret reason that Mugabe was his nephew.