The chapter is split into two major sections, with the first addressing Russian linkages in Moldova and Ukraine. By supporting authoritarian-minded elites in these two states, Russia can help its chosen allies gain and consolidate power. While this notion of bolstering authoritarians is outside the focus of this book, how Russia goes about doing it and the lessons drawn are very much part of the learning process, and so are included here. The next section of the chapter analyses the internal networks in all four case studies that help with learning. The chapter argues that internal networks are crucial to learning and that Russia plays a key role in supporting authoritarian-minded elites in Moldova and Ukraine.

Much of the existing literature has addressed authoritarian learning from external examples but has failed to analyse internal examples. The chapter begins by analysing learning from China, Singapore, and Kazakhstan among the case studies, finding that China is a source of learning. Another example is the restrictive NGO laws that took off after the Russian foreign agents law across the post-Soviet region, which highlights copying at the very least, if not direct learning. The chapter then turns to the domestic, analysing Belarusian learning from the Soviet Union. The main point of interest in the chapter is that the Moldovan and Ukrainian regimes appear to learn from the internal, both in terms of failure and success. This is particularly the case regarding the examples of Plahotniuc and Poroshenko learning from previous regimes both belonged to. The chapter ends with a discussion of the importance of success and failure in authoritarian learning.

The internal aspect of learning is something that the existing literature has not investigated in detail. A range of examples are investigated in this chapter, with the first section addressing Belarusian and Russian learning from the Soviet Union. Then the chapter analyses how Putin learnt from his image failure after the sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine in the early 2000s. The Kursk sinking led to a significant change in image with Putin becoming a macho-man. The 2009 Moldovan Twitter Revolution led to learning after the protest on the part of the nominally pro-European government and the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan provided learning opportunities for Ukrainian governments. The chapter then addresses sub-optimal legislation in Belarus and Russia and potential learning from the failure. Learning from failure has not been investigated too much in the existing literature and this chapter addresses the issue.

Authoritarian learning is a concept that does not merely occur at the highest levels of government. Rather, those involved in the actual learning tend to be personnel further down the state hierarchy. This chapter analyses which state institutions are involved in learning. While information is difficult to obtain, there are pointers in the chapter to the notion that lower-level personnel are the main protagonists when it comes to learning. While there are several institutions involved in learning, there are differences in the number engaged in learning from external and internal examples