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1 results

  • 6 - Cross-National Variation in Sovereignty and Hierarchy

  • Jesse Dillon Savage, Trinity College Dublin
  • Book:
    Political Survival and Sovereignty in International Relations
    Published online:
    09 March 2020
    Print publication:
    12 March 2020, pp 181-216

  • Summary

    In this chapter, I show that the combination of competition and rent-seeking can explain greater willingness to give up sovereignty in the modern world. The chapter uses two strategies. First, using data concerning sovereignty from the Varieties of Democracy data set, I demonstrate that the interaction between contestation and rent-seeking is associated with lower levels of autonomy in a global sample from 1946 to 2009. The chapter then explores why some of the post-Soviet states have been more prepared to integrate with Russia, giving up sovereignty. Regime types associated with higher levels of contestation over rents, such Personalist authoritarian regimes, are more likely to join Russian organizations or sign agreements of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Regimes that manage elite contestation more effectively, such as Party regimes, do not give up as much sovereignty. Similarly, nonauthoritarian regimes that manage rent-seeking more effectively also give up less sovereignty.