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  • Chapter 2 - The Foundation of Analogy

  • from Part I - Islamic Legal Theory (Uṣūl al-Fiqh) and Related Genres
  • Edited by Omar Anchassi, Universität Bern, Switzerland, Robert Gleave, University of Exeter
  • Book:
    Islamic Law in Context
    Published online:
    14 November 2024
    Print publication:
    21 November 2024, pp 20-32

  • Summary

    This chapter explores the seminal contribution to Islamic legal theory of al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), focusing on his defence of legal analogy (qiyās) against its detractors in al-Mustaṣfā min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl. Al-Ghazālī discusses the justifications for analogy and bases its authority on revelation, rather than reason alone. He opposes both those who deem it rationally impossible to employ analogy in legal matters (against the Baghdādī Muʿtazila and the Shīʿa) and also those who deem it rationally necessary (such as the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs). His position is thus typically an Ashʿarī one: by showing that it is neither impossible nor necessary to use analogy, reason concludes that it is possible to use analogy. This discussion of a point of legal theory is thus heavily inflected by theological debates.