I develop a dynamic model of consumption variety in status goods by introducing a realistic aspect that is new in the existing literature—that a good will not carry status appeal unless it is advertised. As advertisements will divert resources from new product research, growth in new products will be reduced. However, status-good advertisements also enhance distinctiveness of a good and increase a firm’s profit. This will motivate more researches. With the two effects offsetting each other, the original market bias in a standard product-development model—insufficient research due to a general knowledge spillover—cannot be overcome. While introducing advertising into models of this kind does not reverse the original welfare implication of suboptimal growth, this makes available a new and better intervention option—taxing advertisements. This tax is superior to consumption tax, the conventional solution to inefficient status competition, as consumption tax is found to be ineffective in the present model. It is also superior to research subsidies, the conventional solution to suboptimal growth, as subsidies must be financed and is not a self-sufficient policy.

We consider a model of economic growth with altruistic agents who care about their consumption and the disposable income of their offspring. The agents' consumption and the offspring's disposable income are subject to positional concerns. We show that, if the measure of consumption-related positional concerns is sufficiently low and/or the measure of offspring-related positional concerns is sufficiently high, then there is a unique steady-state equilibrium, which is characterized by perfect income and wealth equality, and all intertemporal equilibira converge to it. Otherwise, in steady-state equilibria, the population splits into two classes, the rich and the poor; under this scenario, in any intertemporal equilibrium, all capital is eventually owned by the households that were the wealthiest from the outset and all other households become poor.

We incorporate keeping-up-with-the-Joneses (KUJ) preferences into the Blanchard–Yaari framework and develop a model of balanced growth. In this context we investigate status preference, demographic shocks, and pension policy. We find that a higher degree of KUJ lowers economic growth, whereas, in contrast, a decrease in the fertility and mortality rates increase it. In the second part of the paper we extend the model by incorporating a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system with a statutory retirement date. The latter implies that the growth rate is higher under PAYG. We also consider the implications of pension reform under both defined benefit and defined contribution schemes.