We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Edited by
Jonathan Fuqua, Conception Seminary College, Missouri,John Greco, Georgetown University, Washington DC,Tyler McNabb, Saint Francis University, Pennsylvania
The key idea of Reformed Epistemology is that religious beliefs can be rational even if they are held noninferentially, without being based on arguments. The first part of this chapter clarifies in more detail what Reformed Epistemology says and how the view has evolved in three stages over the past forty years. The first stage was concerned with ground-clearing and initially characterizing the view; the second stage included book-length definitive statements of the view by William Alston and Alvin Plantinga. The third stage consists of twenty-first-century developments of the view, connecting it with, among other things, the cognitive science of religion, cognitively impacted experiences, epistemic intuition, and religious testimony. The second part of the chapter briefly presents three important objections to Reformed Epistemology – having to do with the need for independent confirmation, belief in the Great Pumpkin, and religious disagreement – and considers what can be said in response to them.
Edited by
Jonathan Fuqua, Conception Seminary College, Missouri,John Greco, Georgetown University, Washington DC,Tyler McNabb, Saint Francis University, Pennsylvania
This chapter will illustrate the triple weave of epistemology, metaphysics, and soteriology in Advaita Vedanta, focusing on that advanced by the master exponent of Advaita, Shankara (c. 800 CE). Drawing from the work of Alvin Plantinga and William Alston, the paper will show that Shankara’s soteriological and metaphysical reflection is supported by internalist and externalist epistemologies, with the most important being internalist, owing to Shankara’s metaphysical presuppositions. These epistemological heuristics are deployed to gain insight into Shankara’s religious epistemology and then to stimulate an extended discussion of – and argument for – the epistemic merit of religious testimony and religious experience. Successfully doing all this will illuminate the epistemic value of those two mechanisms but also illustrate the triple weave of philosophical reflection in India, a single intellectual rope, as it were, now constituted by the strands of metaphysics, epistemology, and soteriology. While the focus of the chapter is Shankara’s thought, it will point to other Indian thinkers and systems that similarly – and, arguably, invariably – employ this threefold strand of reasoned reflection to establish and advance their own fundamental philosophical positions.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.