In this chapter, the analysis focusses on a very specific instance of political and legal heterogeneity, with reference to the northern town of Angoche in the newly independent Mozambique. It will show that the heterogeneous state and legal pluralism underwent a significant transformation when the central governing political force (the Frelimo party) was confronted in democratic elections with another, rival political force (Renamo). Even after a multiparty system had been introduced in 1990, the authoritarian political structures that dominated the country in the first period of independence in Mozambique under the one-party system (from 1975 to 1990) still prevailed in central government policies for local authorities. The result of this disjuncture at municipal level and its potential political implications is the object of analysis in this chapter. In the first period of independence, interrupting the state and the law meant a radical and wholesale refusal of the colonial political and legal structures. The assumption was that colonialism had absorbed, cannibalised or disfigured the entire political and legal experience in the colony. The envisaged transformation would be brought about by a top-down, vanguardist, authoritarian process. This experience showed that both the nature and the scale of the planned state and legal transformation were misconceived and were subsequently reformulated as a result of internal conflicts and external pressures.

Chapter 6 assesses why ‒ though facing similar stalemates and other structural challenges ‒ two adjacent districts in Zambézia province experienced the diffusion of militias so differently. The chapter shows that communities learned from neighboring communities about how militias formed and “diffusion agents” migrated to spread the message of militia success, which helped initiate militia diffusion. However, “sustained diffusion” ‒ the persistence of militia activity in a district and integration of the militia into the local security apparatus ‒ depended on the cohesion of elites. The chapter explores the validity of the argument by analyzing the diffusion of the Naparama to a district in Nampula province.

Chapter 5 shows that, while community responses to the violence were widespread, the Naparama militia formed at a strategic moment in time, when “community-empowering military stalemates” emerged. Tracing the process of how Naparama formed over time, the chapter shows that local stalemates shaped community residents’ and local elites preferences and gave rise to windows of opportunity for militia formation. Community residents were willing to engage in armed responses to insurgent violence, as other options appeared inviable. Local administrative elites complained about insufficient support from the provincial government and supported alternative military solutions such as the Naparama. This chapter draws on evidence from an over-time analysis of Naparama’s formation in Zambézia province in Mozambique.

Chapter 4 shows that the warring parties’ strategic aim of controlling the population provided the background for the formation of militias in Mozambique. The control of the population became an end in itself rather than a strategy to control territory. As a consequence, the population's forced resettlement became a major weapon of war. The war’s focus on the people contributed to the rising level of community responses to the violence, which culminated in Naparama's formation.