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Centered on the period between 1987 and 1992, Chapter 4 evaluates how the relationship between abortion and sex equality became central to both the fate of Roe and debate about the American family. To reassure Republican leaders that pro-life positions had a political payoff, abortion foes emphasized family involvement laws that seemed to enjoy popular support, including laws requiring women to notify their husbands or get their consent. In defending these laws, antiabortion activists insisted that abortion had serious costs for the family. Many on both sides resisted a focus on the costs and benefits of abortion. A new and predominantly evangelical clinic-blockade movement rejected consequence-based arguments in favor of religious ones. Believing that the Court would reverse Roe, larger abortion-rights groups like NARAL played up rights-based claims. In court, however, abortion-rights attorneys contended that if forced to carry their pregnancies to term, young women would lose out on emerging financial, political, or educational opportunities. Soon, these arguments played a key role in the discussion of Roe’s fate. Invoking constitutional equality, lawyers looked at the benefits of keeping abortion legal. These arguments shaped the Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
Exploring the period between 1980 and 1986, Chapter 3 studies how groups like NRLC and AUL refocused on overturning Roe. After 1978, when Akron, Ohio, passed a model law, NRLC and AUL lawyers contended that because abortion sometimes harmed women, incremental restrictions should be unconstitutional only if they unduly burdened women rather than helped them. The Supreme Court rejected abortion foes’ arguments in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983), but writing in dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor adopted a version of the undue burden standard that pro-lifers championed. O’Connor’s dissent solidified mainstream pro-life groups’ commitment to a new strategy. Rather than prioritizing a constitutional amendment, abortion foes would gradually chip away at Roe, narrowing its protections and setting the stage for its overruling. By aligning with the GOP, pro-lifers would shape who sat on the Supreme Court. And in defending access restrictions, abortion foes would highlight their benefits – and what they saw as the costs of abortion.
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