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This introductory chapter discusses some of the key aspects of the present-day discussion of paternalism. Interest in paternalism has been heightened recently by the publication of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein's Nudge. They tout an approach to policy-making that is at once paternalistic but will not offend its traditional (libertarian) critics. At the heart of Thaler and Sunstein's defense of libertarian paternalism is a body of psychological research showing that people's choices are influenced by small and apparently insignificant aspects of the choice environment, or what they call the choice architecture. There is a well-known objection to utilitarianism: insofar as it aims to maximize good in the aggregate, individuals can be sacrificed for the greater good. Paternalistic nudges risk harming a portion of the population. Thaler and Sunstein would presumably object to stacking nudges because collectively they might constitute a shove.
This chapter argues that the empirical evidence cited by the authors, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler is capable of supporting a number of competing approaches, including what the author calls libertarian utilitarianism and libertarian justice. Central to Sunstein and Thaler's proposal is their claim that evidence from the social sciences justifies a distinctively paternalistic approach to public policy. The chapter considers three different arguments purporting to justify the use of a paternalist approach to public policy. The first argument comes from a series of publications by Sunstein and Thaler written prior to Nudge. The second reconstructs the argument of Nudge, where the authors merely claim that nudges are inevitable. Finally, the third provides a friendly argument, intended to establish that nudges ought to be paternalistic. This chapter uses an empirical evidence of framing effects to construct nudges aimed at promoting Rawls' theory of justice.
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