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From late 1934 Churchill and Chamberlain were influenced by intelligence reports on the scale of German rearmament. Churchill successfully pressed the government to accelerate the expansion of the RAF. Chamberlain agreed in principle to a defence loan, thereby making possible much higher defence expenditure than when he had insisted on balanced budgets. Both men supported appeasement of Mussolini when he attacked Ethiopia, since both saw Italy as a potential counterweight to Germany. Both Chamberlain and Churchill advocated an early end to League of Nations sanctions against Italy after the collapse of Ethiopian resistance. The connection between the Ethiopian crisis and the German military occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 is explained, Hitler having been encouraged by the failure of sanctions, the consequent reduction in British prestige and the breach between Italy and the western powers. Churchill denounced the British rearmament programme, announced in the same month, as inadequate, and urged a greater diversion of industry to defence contracts than Chamberlain thought safe. On the other hand, both men gave priority to the air force and opposed a commitment to send the army to France.
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