This chapter is dedicated to Article 101(1) TFEU balancing tools. It examines tools aimed at balancing competition with state or public interests, such as the state action defence, notion of undertakings, Article 106(2) TFEU exception for services of general economic interests, the exception for collective bargaining agreements between employers and employees, and the inherent restriction doctrine. The chapter also studies tools for balancing competition and commercial interests, such as the rule of reason, objectively necessary agreements, ancillary restraints, and the de minimis doctrine. The chapter shows that unlike most of the explicit-substantive balancing tools that are based on EU primary or secondary law and which were largely developed by the Commission, the wording of Article 101(1) TFEU does not explicitly refer to a balancing function. Rather, the balancing tools of Article 101(1) TFEU are predominantly derived from the CJEU’s case law. It reveals that the CJEU introduced those tools to counterbalance the Commission’s broad interpretation of what constitutes a restriction of competition falling within the ambit of Article 101(1) TFEU. The Court has held that agreements restricting the commercial freedom of parties might escape the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU if they are necessary for attaining social or efficiency-related goals.

This chapter is dedicated to Article 101(1) TFEU balancing tools. It examines tools aimed at balancing competition with state or public interests, such as the state action defence, notion of undertakings, Article 106(2) TFEU exception for services of general economic interests, the exception for collective bargaining agreements between employers and employees, and the inherent restriction doctrine. The chapter also studies tools for balancing competition and commercial interests, such as the rule of reason, objectively necessary agreements, ancillary restraints, and the de minimis doctrine. The chapter shows that unlike most of the explicit-substantive balancing tools that are based on EU primary or secondary law and which were largely developed by the Commission, the wording of Article 101(1) TFEU does not explicitly refer to a balancing function. Rather, the balancing tools of Article 101(1) TFEU are predominantly derived from the CJEU’s case law. It reveals that the CJEU introduced those tools to counterbalance the Commission’s broad interpretation of what constitutes a restriction of competition falling within the ambit of Article 101(1) TFEU. The Court has held that agreements restricting the commercial freedom of parties might escape the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU if they are necessary for attaining social or efficiency-related goals.

Chaptr 25 offers a survey of the many ways in which antitrust and competition law affect IP licensing transactions. It begins with a brief overview of US antitrust law and enforcement and distinguishes between per se liability and liability under the rule of reason. It then considers how antitrust authorities have viewed IP transations, beginning with the Nine No-Nos (1970) and more recent agency pronouncements. The chapter then describes specific antitrust doctrines that impact IP transactions: price fixing, market allocation (US v. Topco), resale price maintenance (Leegin v PSKS), tying (Siegel v. Chicken Delight), monopolization (Illinois Tool Works v. Indep. Ink), refusals to deal (The Movie 1 & 2), standard setting (Allied Tube v. Indian Head), reverse payment settlements (FTC v. Actavis).

This chapter considers the role antitrust law can play in safeguarding repair markets and, along with them, the interests of competitors and consumers. While IP law may grants device makers power over their products, antitrust and competition law are designed to impose limits on exclusionary behavior. As a result, they serve as potential bulwarks against tactics that would impede repair. Despite significant doctrinal and policy hurdles to enforcement, antitrust law can help discipline firms that attempt to capture markets for the repair of vehicles, electronics, and appliances that account for hundreds of billions of dollars in annual revenue.