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1 results

  • Chapter 7 - The Tractatus and the First Person

  • Edited by José L. Zalabardo, University College London
  • Book:
    Wittgenstein's <I>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</I>
    Published online:
    07 March 2024
    Print publication:
    14 March 2024, pp 125-144

  • Summary

    The method proposed in the Tractatus is to find a perspicuous logic of our language. It thus seems to conform to Russell’s ideal of a scientific method in philosophy. Language, though, is for Wittgenstein essentially the language of the first person. This means that the central issues in the Tractatus, such as ‘What is a sentence?’ and ‘What is a judgement?’, have to be approached by means of a first-person method. Perhaps surprisingly, this method is less vulnerable to psychologism than Russell’s method. How are we to understand the use of the first-person indexical in the Tractatus? It is not used as a referring term: it does not stand for the author, a world-soul, or a transcendental subject. Its function is rather to engage the reader in applying the first-person method when aiming to understand the Tractatus.