An epilogue explores several topics regarding the future of modern air warfare. The first section offers recommendations for how the United States can better prepare for modern air warfare. The second considers air power in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. The third anticipates the role of air power in extending deterrence to allies. The fourth demonstrates how TAP theory can assess the potential effectiveness of air power by analyzing the Russian Air Force in the Battle of Kyiv. The final section considers additional challenges facing the United States during an emerging era of great power competition.

Moscow’s air power success in Syria presents an opportunity to assess Russian inter- and intra-war adaptation in kinetic counterinsurgency. New technologies and tactics have enhanced the Russian Aerospace Force’s battlefield lethality and resilience but have not yet triggered a fundamental transition in operating concept. Russia’s air force has yet to actualize a reconnaissance-strike regime or advanced air-ground integration. Instead, situational and strategic factors appear to be more powerful contributors to its superior performance in the Syrian conflict. The way in which Russia has chosen to leverage its improvements in accurate munitions delivery, moreover, highlights key differences between its warfighting philosophy and that embraced by major Western powers. The resultant findings provide insight into Moscow’s coercive campaign logic, force-planning imperatives, and the likelihood that it might re-export the Syria model elsewhere.