Chapter 8 returns to state and opposition contestation between national election cycles. It describes how the regime uses the advantages described in the formal model in Chapter 3 to respond to different electoral contexts, sometimes allowing the opposition to compete and banning them in other cases. In response, the opposition continues to innovate its strategies to generate new information about regime manipulation and the lack of electoral accountability. This process creates a perpetual campaign as the regime and opposition clash over elections at every level of the political system and between elections to shape information environments. The regime is forced to be nimble as it seeks to limit the diffusion of successful opposition strategies and avoid having to reveal new information in national elections. The focus on the Russian case describes regime success in 2016 and 2018 when it engineered victories without provoking protest. It also demonstrates that these efforts moved the regime incrementally in an autocratic direction, generating new political tensions and opposition opportunities. Victory did not end the potential for a breakthrough in the next election.

Chapter 4 focuses on the Russian case, showing that even weakly organized oppositions can influence electoral outcomes. The chapter demonstrates how central concepts in social movement theory, social movement organizations, opportunity structure, and mobilizing frames also influence the information environment in which elections are held. The narrative illustrates that between 2008 and 2011, the Russian opposition altered popular perception by creating a coalition across different types of protest groups. It also underscores that the opposition’s unwillingness and inability to work with labor organizations limited the reach of the nascent movement and precluded cross-class coalition that is central to regime breakthrough. Nonetheless, these changes generated new information about the structure and reach of opposition as the 2011 election approached. The regime response included organizing new, state-sponsored organization, the articulation of competing frames, and the judicious use of repression. While these efforts shored up core regime support they failed to stifle opposition signals and may have demonstrated growing fears as the next election cycle approached.