The last chapter that focuses on individual decisions, discusses activism in rallies and protests as a national conversation over Russia’s future. The first section of the chapter demonstrates that the protest actions in Moscow framed this conversation and provided a focal point for increased participation. The findings support information cascade theories of mobilization in the protest movement but not in the rallies, where increased participation continued to rely on regime incentives. The second section of the chapter focuses on the competing frames that the opposition and regime developed to characterize the national conversation. Relying on the data, the final section focuses on frame resonance, exploring the effectiveness of state and opposition framing in shaping protesters attitudes.

The formal model presented in the chapter underscores that control over ballot access conveys a significant power advantage to autocratic incumbents. This control leaves electoral oppositions with few options. Yet, even with this power asymmetry, the model demonstrates that elections force autocrats to make strategic choices that reveal information about regime strengths and weaknesses. Banning strong opponents signals regime weakness. Committing fraud to secure victories signals that elections are not mechanisms of accountability. When opposition parties amplify this information, they can generate focal points to foster societal coordination, forcing the regime to respond with concessions or retribution. Depending on the size and structure of the mobilization, these changes can be sudden or incremental, generating uncertainty that has to be addressed in the inter-election period. Through this process, tightly controlled elections contested by weakly organized opposition parties can prompt regime shifts in a liberalizing or autocratic direction. The first part of the chapter presents the model discursively, and the second part formalizes the argument.

Chapter 6 returns to the social movement literature to create a framework to understand who joins post-election rallies and protests. Engaging the complex literature on differential participation, this analysis highlights the critical role of information in mobilization, and explains protest using life cycle variables such as age, education, and income; political interest; personal networks; regime support; and media consumption. This analysis demonstrates that both protesters and rally participants are more interested and better informed about politics than nonparticipants. The analysis also shows that while the regime incentivized pro-regime participation, the ralliers did support the regime and President Putin. The study also highlights the importance of micro-mobilizing structures such as networks on individual-level participation. Among protesters, online discussion helped build mobilizing personal networks and frame alignment. The second part of the chapter explores the meaning of inaction. This analysis shows that popular disengagement in Russia does not signal regime support but it is linked to perceptions that President Putin is crucial to addressing shared grievances.

This chapter places recent events in the context of the theoretic framework. In 2024, President Putin and his government face the same challenge that it faced in 2008. Constitutional term limits mandate that Putin leave office, prompting broad speculation about its effect on the 2021 parliamentary elections and the presidential race. Consistent with the formal model, the regime banned the opposition in Moscow’s 2019 municipal elections and the opposition unified to send a protest signal. Popular response kicked off some of the largest protests in recent years. In response, the Kremlin increased the use of repression against protesters, a move that provided new information about the regime type. Voters carried the protest into the voting booth and sent a strong signal in support of opposition candidates. In addition, the Kremlin moved to manage the next national election cycle by instituting signification constitutional reform and launching new social welfare programs. The final section of the chapter highlights the contributions of the study for comparative politics and Russia regional studies.