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2 results

  • 9 - Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief

  • Edited by Alan Berger, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
  • Book:
    Saul Kripke
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    06 June 2011, pp 211-234

  • Summary

    Pierre's experience in England warrants our saying that he believes that London is not pretty. This leads to a puzzle does Pierre, or does he not believe that London is pretty. This chapter explores a question that why should one care about Pierre. Saul Kripke suggests that the way the puzzle about Pierre arises casts doubt on a standard argument against "Millianism", the view that the semantic role of a proper name is exhausted by its being a name of whatever it names. If one thinks of a way of thinking as something to be identified with, or at least individuated in terms of, a collection of objects, properties, and relations, the puzzles Kripke presents us with are indeed difficult to solve. Kripke's puzzle is a puzzle about belief. Linguistic interpretation is not exactly Millian, but it is, or at least is usually, pretty close.

  • 10 - A Note on Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief

  • Edited by Alan Berger, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
  • Book:
    Saul Kripke
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    06 June 2011, pp 235-252

  • Summary

    Millianism is the belief that the semantic content of a proper name is just the name's designatum. Millianism has it that Pierre has the contradictory beliefs that London is pretty and that London is not pretty Kripke uses his well-known puzzle about belief as a defense of Millianism against the standard objection from apparent failure of substitution. This chapter argues relatively hard results in connection with Saul Kripke's well-known puzzle about belief, and for resulting constraints on a correct solution. A complete solution must acknowledge that Pierre has contradictory beliefs. In presenting the puzzle, Kripke follows a sound methodology championed in Alfred Tarski's classic discussion of the liar paradox. Unlike Tarski, Kripke does not make any official pronouncement concerning which principles are guilty. Instead he considers a variety of possible answers to the puzzle without officially endorsing any of them.