Some celestial objects, later recognized as quasars, were catalogued back in 1887, and their extragalactic nature was discussed as early as 1960. However, the large measured redshift of 3C 48 was rejected, largely because it implied an unrealistically high radio and optical luminosity. Instead it was assumed to be a relatively nearby, less luminous galactic radio star. Following the 1962 observations of lunar occultations of the strong radio source 3C 273 at the Parkes radio telescope and the subsequent identification with an apparent stellar object, Martin Schmidt recognized that 3C 273 had an unmistakable redshift of 0.16. Due to an error in the calculation of the radio position, the occultation position actually played no direct role in the identification of 3C 273, although it was the existence of a claimed accurate occultation position that motivated Schmidt’s 200 inch telescope investigation and his determination of the redshift. Later radio and optical measurements quickly led to the identification of other quasars with increasingly large redshifts, although the nature of the quasar redshifts remained controversial for decades.

This chapter considers the private lives of the German generals. As men who are typically studied exclusively for their military roles, this chapter uses their letters to ask questions about how they expressed themselves in the ‘private’ sphere. Not surprisingly, their wives, to varying degrees, served as confidants as well as sources of strength. The role of the prominent military wife is also directly discussed with reference to letters by Margarete Guderian – the only available collection from one of the generals’ wives. The role of family is discussed, including the presence of military-age sons who were serving on the Eastern Front in 1941. The demands of senior command took a serious toll on each of the men and the letters over the course of 1941 chart their exposure to physical danger as well as psychological pressure. Coping mechanisms employed by the generals, such as free-time hobbies or spiritual beliefs are also evaluated from their writings. Overall, the value of the correspondence in illuminating a much more rounded view of the panzer generals charged with leading Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union is highlighted.

Although a lot has been written (mainly in German) about field post in the German army during the Second World War and the many historiographical issues concerned with it, very little study has been devoted to the letter collections of the German generals. This chapter attempts first to consider this unique collection of sources and discuss where they have been used before and to what end. There is also a discussion about why they have not been used more generally in past operational histories. The problems with Kurrentschrift, and even the standardised Sütterlinschrift, are explained to make readers aware of the complexity inherent in tackling letters from a generation of men educated in the late nineteenth century. Another major focus of the chapter are issues concerned with veracity and verification of the correspondence. A statical analysis of each collection provides a remarkable insight into anomalies, which reveals that letters are missing (or were withheld) from the publicly available collection. This is an important qualification of the study and already points to an attempt by the generals to present a selective post-war image.

No serious investigation of German generals on the Eastern Front can avoid an explicit engagement with the ubiquitous criminality that pervaded the occupation of the Soviet Union. Given that the letters of the generals were provided by family descendants who tended to venerate their famous relatives, it should not be surprising that the letters do not explicitly mention German war crimes or the Holocaust. Yet that in itself is a telling omission given the direct evidence from divisional, corps and panzer groups files pointing to widespread, even exceptional, killing programs within the units under Guderian, Hoepner, Reinhardt and Schmidt’s command. All four men were among the most active in carrying out the murderous Commissar Order as well as the violent suppression of perceived acts of resistance in their zone of control. Moreover, the post-war myth of an honourable and ‘clean’ German army finds no such supporting evidence in the correspondence – there is not one letter in a combined collection spanning well over 100 examples that expresses any outrage or even acknowledgment of the mass murder of Soviet Jews. Indeed, there is no criticism for any of the action undertaken by the German security force or army.

Typically, the success of a general is thought to be measured in their professionalism and military achievements, however this is only partly true of the German Wehrmacht. As the letters reveal, the panzer generals were very much aware that their career success was determined by gaining public prominence and attaching oneself to battlefield triumph. This consumed a remarkable amount of their time and, in no small part, helped shape the direction of their campaigns. Propaganda companies operating at the front become engines for self-promotion, which transformed the achievement of the formation into the achievement of the individual. The most successful practitioners of this media campaign, like Guderian, became indivisible with the all-conquering German Panzertruppe in the East, while others who commanded similar sized forces, like Hoepner, proved far less successful. One of the consequences of such military celebrity, which was unique to the German Wehrmacht, was the autograph-hunting children who sent countless requests to the generals and often received favourable responses. The culture of public acclaim and mutual support fed the National Socialist ethos of front and Heimat united in struggle.

For lowly German soldiers there were highly restrictive rules about what information could be included in their letters home, but the correspondence of the leading panzer generals were not subject to any form of censorship and they felt themselves at liberty to discuss all manner of military operations. This may have been militarily reckless, but it provides an unfiltered view of German operations and the personal relations among the high command. More specifically, one sees how the generals account for their successes and failures, with the former being routinely embraced, while the latter are typically blamed on individuals failing to support them. What is notable about these explanations are the relative absence of geographic, topographical or environmental factors in slowing their advance. Likewise, the countermeasures of the Red Army scarcely rate a mention and the same is true of German organisational or logistic difficulties. The letters offer an insight into a world view that suggests the army command alone will decide the outcome, if only the correct decisions are made.