In “On Intelligible Fatalism in the Critical Philosophy” (1794), Johann Christoph Schwab levels several accusations against C.C.E. Schmid’s doctrine of intelligible fatalism. First, whereas the Leibnizian-Wolffian determinist can hope to overcome the forces opposed to freedom insofar as these are natural and alterable, the intelligible fatalist cannot hold any such hope because the intelligible forces opposed to freedom are immutable. Second, insofar as Schmid acknowledges a sensible matter given to the rational being, he seems committed to two kinds of obstacles to reason’s self-activity: sensible and intelligible obstacles. This supposedly makes Schmid’s view inferior to the Leibnizian-Wolffian account, which posits only one sort of obstacle to freedom. Lastly, Schwab claims that intelligible fatalism abolishes the concepts of blame and imputation. Thus, concludes Schwab, the Leibnizian-Wolffian conception of free will is superior to that of intelligible fatalism.

In “On the Two Kinds of I, and the Concept of Freedom in Kant’s Ethics” (1792), Johann Christoph Schwab treats Schmid’s claim that the sensible self is grounded in a supersensible I, which parallels Kant’s distinction between the empirical and intelligible character. Schwab echoes Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s charge that such a supersensible posit is guilty of an illicit extension of the categories beyond the sphere of possible experience. Moreover, Schwab maintains, even if this supersensible posit is granted, nothing could be predicated of it and yet Schmid makes several claims about it, e.g. it is the ground of all our actions, it is the ground of space and time, it is unalterable, etc. Schwab concludes the essay by taking issue with Schmid’s claim that on the Leibnizian-Wolffian view, the determining grounds of action are entirely beyond the agent’s control. In response to this charge, Schwab appeals to the Leibnizian-Wolffian conception of spontaneity and claims that the determining grounds of free action are contained within the agent itself.