In Chapter 5, the final case study examines the spate of Tibetans burning themselves alive in opposition to rule by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 2009. First delineating significant events in the relationship between the nation of Tibet and the PRC, prior to and through the Cultural Revolution, I describe the social, political, and cultural situation of Tibetans during their loss of their sovereign nation. Interrogating the most attested claims and desires of these self-immolators—called pawo or martyrs in Tibetan circles—I highlight the role Tibetan Buddhism plays in the conflict as target of the PRC, core of Tibetan identity, and solution to the crisis on the plateau. I connect that discussion to an analysis of the historical and religious bases for the practice of auto-cremation as a means of resistance and meritorious action. Drawing these arguments together, I conclude by describing the state of emergency within Tibet, most notable in lands which now exist within the internationally recognized borders of China. I conclude by showing how suffering is constructed as an affirmation of the truth of the Tibetan imaginary made plain in the burned bodies of pawo.

There were many turning points and key moments in spring 1989 that could have pushed events in new directions and led to different outcomes. They included inviting students to attend Hu Yaobang's memorial service, Zhao Ziyang not traveling to North Korea, protesters escalating their civil disobedience through self-immolation, and convening a special session of the National People's Congress (NPC) to rescind martial law. These were all genuine possibilities, but they were made less possible by the realities of old-man politics.

This chapter continues with the argument that the built-in tensions of the autonomous system, namely centralization and ethnicization, have intensified in the reform era. The focus of this chapter is religious revival in Tibet and Xinjiang. Religion has been a volatile problem in the state’s relationship with the two outer peripheral regions, thanks to its crucial linkage to ethnic and cultural identity. This identity, in turn, can be linked to ethno-nationalism and even separatism. Heightened institutional tensions for ethnic strife have stemmed, on the one hand, from state sponsorship of religious revival, and on the other hand, from state curtailment of its unsanctioned growth. The alternatively facilitating and constraining roles of the state have intensified centralization as well as ethnicization in the religious development of Tibet and Xinjiang, or cycles of state facilitation/control of religion and ethnic backlash. Foremost among this backlash has been increased radicalization, from private madrassas, Wahhabism, “Arabianization,” and “terrorism” in the Uighur case, to self-immolation in the Tibetan case. These have in turn induced state crackdowns, including deradicalization camps.