The distribution of nitric oxide synthase (NOS) immunoreactivity and putative NOS activity in adult Schistosoma mansoni was analysed using 3 different types of NOS antibodies and NADPH-diaphorase histochemistry. Although potential involvement of the gaseous radical nitric oxide (NO) in host response to infection by schistosomes has been suggested, there is little or no information available regarding the role, or even the presence, of the NO pathway in schistosomes themselves. Here, we demonstrate that antibodies against neuronal NOS (nNOS) and inducible NOS (iNOS) isoforms stain adult worms with distinctive patterns; anti-endothelial NOS (eNOS) shows no selective labelling. nNOS-like immunoreactivity is found in the main nerve cords and the peripheral nervous system. Putative sensory neurons with apical neuronal processes leading to the tegument of male worms are also immunoreactive for nNOS. Anti-iNOS labels a variety of predominantly non-neuronal tissues, showing intense labelling at or near the surface of the worm and in components of the gastrointestinal tract. The distribution of NADPH-diaphorase reactivity (a histochemical marker of NOS), is generally similar to the pattern of NOS immunoreactivity, including labelling of neuronal-like cells as well as developing eggs. These results suggest that an NOS-like enzyme is present in S. mansoni, and indicate potential roles for the different NOS isoforms in neuronal signalling, reproduction and development.

In this target article we question the assumption that perception is divided into separate domains of vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. We review implications of this assumption for theories of perception and for our understanding of ambient energy arrays (e.g., the optic and acoustic arrays) that are available to perceptual systems. We analyze three hypotheses about relations between ambient arrays and physical reality: (1) that there is an ambiguous relation between ambient energy arrays and physical reality, (2) that there is a unique relation between individual energy arrays and physical reality, and (3) that there is a redundant but unambiguous relation, within or across arrays, between energy arrays and physical reality. This is followed by a review of the physics of motion, focusing on the existence and status of referents for physical motion. Our review indicates that it is not possible, in principle, for there to be a unique relation between physical motion and the structure of individual energy arrays. We argue that physical motion relative to different referents is specified only in the global array, which consists of higher-order relations across different forms of energy. The existence of specificity in the global array is consistent with the idea of direct perception, and so poses a challenge to traditional, inference-based theories of perception and cognition. However, it also presents a challenge to much of the ecological approach to perception and action, which has accepted the assumption of separate senses.