The gap in the life expectancy of the elderly across educational groups is high, and this will probably increase over the coming decades. In this article, we use a computable overlapping generations model economy to show that the long-term link between heterogeneity in longevity and education could translate into an implicit tax/subsidy on the expected lifetime benefits to lifetime payroll taxes ratio, with rates around 10%, and that such rates pervert redistributive objectives of pension systems. We then analyze some parametric changes aimed at restoring the progressiveness of these systems in the long run, and find that a higher minimum pension or changes in the pension benefit formula go a long way as tools to restore the system's long-term progressivity.

We study the fiscal and welfare consequences of three options for increasing pension generosity in Spain: (i) disability and minimum pensions are fully indexed with the Consumer Price Index (CPI); (ii) minimum and lower value pensions are fully indexed with the CPI; and (iii) returning to full price indexation of all Spanish pensions. While these reforms increase pension adequacy, the tax increases needed to finance the higher pension expenditure differ significantly. Moreover, most current cohorts prefer returning to the full price indexation of all Spanish pensions, but future cohorts prefer that only disability and minimum pensions be indexed with the CPI.

We use an overlapping generations model economy with endogenous retirement to study the 2011 and 2013 reforms of the Spanish public pension system. These reforms delay the legal retirement ages, increase the contributivity of the system, and adopt a sustainability factor and a pension revualuation index that effectively transform the Spanish pension system into a defined-contribution pension system. We find that these reforms improve the sustainability of Spanish pensions substantially, and that they limit the tax increases that would have been necessary to finance the pension system deficits. But these results are achieved at the expense of large reductions in the real value of the average pension. This reduction is progressive and, by 2050, the average pension is approximately 30% smaller in real terms than what it would have been under the pension system rules that prevailed in 2010. We also show that these reforms are costly in welfare terms and that households born between 1950 and 1970, young disabled workers who are alive at the time of the reform, and future cohorts bear the highest welfare costs. The substantial reduction of pensions and the high welfare costs that these reforms bring about lead us to conjecture that further reforms lurk in the future of Spanish pensions.