This chapter explores the emergence of a distinct right to artistic freedom in international human rights law. It starts with an exploration of the input of constitutional traditions, as well as State practice and arguments brought by delegates during the drafting process of article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with respect to freedom of creativity. It further provides an exhaustive examination of the legal instruments protecting freedom of enjoyment of the arts as an individual right, as well as its collective dimension. In particular, the chapter adopts a twofold approach to artistic freedom, viewed both as a component of freedom of expression (the ‘free speech’ approach) under article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and as a cultural right under article 15 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Finally, the chapter thoroughly explores the scope and institutional protection of artistic freedom in the practice of international and regional human rights bodies (including but not limited to the European Court of Human RIgths), as well as the UN Specialized Agency for Science Education and Culture (UNESCO).

The chapter draws a comparison between the recent doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the duty of progressive realization, nonretrogression and use of the maximum of available resources and that of the United Nations Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the cases decided from 2013 through individual communications. The Optional Protocol introduces the standard of reasonableness in the examination of the measures adopted by states to comply with its obligations, but whenever the satisfaction of the right’s minimum core, or the position of vulnerable groups is at stake, the Committee applies a sort of “strict scrutiny.” In these cases, a presumption of invalidity applies, the burden of justification shifts, and the state must demonstrate the unavailability of less restrictive measures. Reasoning about necessity and alternatives is often relevant also for the Inter-American Court, but this court does not adopt a structured proportionality analysis and develops the relevant notions and state obligations along formally different lines. The chapter analyzes commonalities and differences between the two approaches, signaling lines of evolution that emerge when placed in dialogue with one another.

This chapter first provides a brief historical overview of the international indigenous rights movement. It then discusses the definitions of “indigenous peoples”. It also analyzes the content of “indigenous rights,” focusing on the issues of right to self-determination and economic, social and cultural rights, followed by an examination of the role of the UN and indigenous NGOs in protecting and promoting indigenous rights.

A comprehensive discussion of the UN’s human rights work and institutions is an infinite task given that every atom of the Organisation is engaged in one way or another in the promotion or protection of rights. As a result, a large part of this chapter is devoted to the examination of the principal human rights institution, the Human Rights Council (HRC), and the various mechanisms operating under its wing. This includes a discussion of the universal periodic review (UPR), the HRC’s complaint procedure, as well as its so-called special procedures. The chapter then goes on to analyse the important human rights dimension of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the UNSC, since both possess authority to take direct action against violations, in addition to their standard-setting capacity. Institutions that have produced important human rights work, but whose mandate is otherwise peripheral to human rights, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), are mentioned in this chapter but are not extensively analysed. Equally, space precludes us from examining specialised agencies such as UN International Children’s (Emergency) Fund (UNICEF) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

In the conclusions, the book editors assess the existing national and international regulatory frameworks in the light of the five foundational principles that they identified by reading international bioethics law in conjunction with international human rights standards: (i) freedom of research; (ii) benefit sharing; (iii) solidarity; (iv) respect for dignity; and (v) the obligation to respect and to protect the rights and individual freedoms of others. Their analysis reveals four issues common to most national regulatory frameworks as well as the international framework: (i) The prohibition to create embryos for research embryos cannot be reconciled with the right to science and the rights of science; (ii) limitations to scientific freedom based on vague laws are not truly limitations “determined by law”; (iii) limitations to scientific freedom based on obsolete laws are not limitations accepted in a “democratic society”; (iv) ne plus ultra prohibitions breach the right of everyone to benefit from scientific and technological progress and the principle of benefit sharing. The editors conclude by sketching an international governance framework that promotes science and technological development while being mindful and respectful of international human rights standards, as well as the different sensitivities with which citizens from different parts of the world approach the question of human germline genome modification.